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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the vulnerability of the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) to algebraic attacks. It will explore how strong the Rijndael 
algorithm must be in order to secure important federal information. 
There are several algebraic methods of attack that can be used to break a 
specific cipher, such as Buchburger’s and Faugere’s F4 and F5 methods. The 
method to be used and evaluated in this thesis is the Multiple Right Hand Sides 
(MRHS) Linear Equations. MRHS is a new method that allows computations to 
be more efficient and the equations to be more compact in comparison with the 
previously referred methods. 
Because of the high complexity of the Rijndael algorithm, the purpose of 
this thesis is to investigate the results of an MRHS attack in a small-scale variant 
of the AES, since it is impossible to break the actual algorithm by using only the 
existent knowledge. Instead of the original ten rounds of AES algorithm, variants 
of up to four rounds were used.  
Simple examples of deciphering some ciphertexts are presented for 
different variants of the AES, and the new attack method of MRHS linear 
equations is compared with the other older methods. 
This method is more effective timewise than the other older methods, but, 
in some cases, some systems cannot be uniquely solved. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis compares different algebraic methods for solving and breaking 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. However, emphasis is given 
to the Multiple Right Hand Side (MRHS) Linear Equation method, which is a new 
algebraic method used for attacking ciphers with specific algebraic structures. 
Such a cipher is the Rijndael algorithm, which was adopted by the U.S. 
government as the most efficient among others in order to secure federal 
information. 
In cryptography, it is considered that a cipher is broken when a method 
other than the brute force attack can reduce the complexity of the algorithm or 
completely decipher it. The “brute force attack” method is a very simple method 
in which we try one by one all the possible keys in order to break the cipher. In 
particular, due to the complexity of the AES algorithm, it becomes very difficult to 
break it with this method. Therefore, AES generated interest to find a specific 
algorithm to break this cipher. Some of the older algebraic methods, such as 
Buchberger’s algorithm and Faugere’s F4 and F5 algorithms, which are briefly 
presented in Chapter II, cannot break this cipher. This work considers a new 
algebraic method (MRHS) that can break small variants of the AES. Even the 
breaking of a small variant of the algorithm constitutes a success, since it opens 
a new horizon in the cryptanalysis field. 
A comparison with the older algebraic attack methods that are presented 
in [9] shows that the MRHS method is faster than the others. In Chapter II, there 
is a quick overview for some of these methods and a more detailed analysis of 
MRHS method with some algebraic examples. 
The overall concept of this thesis is to create a program that  will break a 
small variant of the Rijndael algorithm. This work is based on the codes that 
Professors Håvard Raddum and Igor Semaev (of University of Bergen, Norway) 
provided to us. These codes (in the “C” language) are the application of the 
 xiv
MRHS method to the AES algorithm. In this thesis, we created new programs, 
which construct the equation systems of the AES algorithm, that we tried to solve 
by using the codes of Professors Raddum and Semaev. Our computational 
experiments examined many cases never considered in previous work. 
This thesis demonstrates that, for a small variant of the AES, this method 
is very efficient (few high-level operations). In the third chapter, some examples 
are contained that show how this algorithm works. In some of the computational 
experiments, a totally new and significant result appeared for the cryptanalysis 
field; sometimes a small AES variant can have multiple decryption keys for a 
specific encryption key. This result is surprising and is not mentioned anywhere 
by Professors Raddum and Semaev. 
In particular, the first example shows a case in which the MRHS method 
finds multiple solutions to the system (it fails to solve the system—break the 
cipher) and in the second one, all the MRHS linear equations are transformed 
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In 1976, the United States government as an official Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) adopted the Data Encryption Standard (DES). 
Today, this standard is considered insecure, and the necessity for a new more 
secure and efficient standard has emerged. Therefore, in 1997, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology published a call for the replacement of 
DES. Among the requirements this new system had to meet were: the new 
algorithm should be able to allow key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits; it should 
operate on blocks of 128 input bits, and it should work in a variety of different 
hardware. For example, 8-bit processors that could be used in smart cards and 
the 32-bit architecture commonly used in personal computers [1]. 
For the adoption of the new algorithm, five finalists were chosen: MARS 
(from IBM), RC6 (from RSA Laboratories), Rijndael (from Joan Daemen and 
Vincent Rijmen), Serpent (from Ross Anderson, Eli Biham and Lars Knudsen) 
and Twofish (from Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey, Doug Whiting, David Wagner, 
Chris Hall and Niels Ferguson). Finally, in 2001, the Rijndael algorithm [2] was 
adopted as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [3]. 
B. RELATED WORK 
This new algorithm was of great interest for the area of cryptanalysis. The 
cryptanalists started to seek ways to attack this algorithm, which might lead to 
breaking the algorithm (finding the key more efficiently than a brute-force attack). 
Since Rijndael’s algorithm is defined using algebraic operations in finite fields, 
cryptanalists investigated algebraic methods in order to break it. Therefore, they 
started to try the already known algebraic techniques for solving systems of 
polynomial equations. Some of them were the Buchburger’s algorithm and the F4 
and F5 algorithms [4] that are summarized in Chapter II with some simple 
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examples. Also, they tried to describe the new algorithm by using some different 
algebraic representations over the Galois finite fields [4] that are discussed in the 
same chapter.  
Recently, a new algebraic method was developed that used Multiple Right 
Hand Sides (MRHS) Linear Equations [5]. The main difference with the other 
algebraic methods is that the equations, which describe the algorithm, are not 
expressed anymore as multivariate polynomial equations, but instead they are 
presented as a system of linear equations, each having a set of multiple right 
hand sides. 
The Norwegian Professors Håvard Raddum and Igor Semaev first 
developed this method. After a comparison between the Buchberger’s F4 
algorithms and the MRHS method, they concluded that the last one is much 
faster. 
In this thesis, after we borrowed the codes [6] from the Norwegian team, 
we managed to simulate the AES algorithm in the C language and to break 
small-scale variants of the Rijndael’s algorithm. After the application of the 
above-mentioned codes, many computational experiments were executed to 
explore how the method would work in many different cases. Though the 
previous work of Raddum and Semaev [5] only considered AES variants using 
the 8-bit field, we also explored variants based on 4-bit and 2-bit fields. From 
these experiments, we obtained some very surprising new results about the 
decryption (breaking) of variants of the Rijndael algorithm. In particular, one of 
the them is that there are some cases that a ciphertext, which was encrypted by 
a specific key, could be broken by using a definite number of different keys. This 
is explained in detail in Chapter III. 
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C. INTRODUCTION TO AES 
Although the Rijndael algorithm was adopted as the official algorithm for 
AES, it is important to note that the algorithm, which is used in the AES, is a 
limited version of the Rijndael’s algorithm. In particular, Rijndael is a block cipher 
with both a variable block length and a variable key length [2]. While Rijndael’s 
algorithm can be used for block and key lengths in any multiple of 32 bits, with a 
minimum of 128 bits and a maximum of 256 bits, AES uses constant block length 
of 128 bits and key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits only. Also, this algorithm is 
applicable with a different number of rounds (Nr), depending on the number of 
columns of the cipher key (Nk) and the number of columns of the rectangular 
array (Nb) called state, which is actually the intermediate cipher result of the 
algorithm. In Table 1, the number of rounds are shown as a function of the block 
and key length. 
 Nb 
Nk 4 5 6 7 8 
4 10 11 12 13 14 
5 11 11 12 13 14 
6 12 12 12 13 14 
7 13 13 13 13 14 
8 14 14 14 14 14 
 
Table 1.   Number of rounds, Nr, as a function of Nb (block length/32) and Nk (key 
length/32). 
Since, in this thesis, only the AES algorithm will be examined, it is good to 
analyze the subcases of the Rijndael’s algorithm that are used in the AES. For 
the encryption process, the input is the plaintext block and the initial key and the 
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output is the ciphertext block. In the decryption process, the input is the 
ciphertext block and the output the plaintext block. 
With a 128-bit key length, the algorithm applies 10 rounds. (A 192-bit key 
length contains 12 rounds and a 256-bit length contains 14 rounds). In each 
round, there are four transformations (linear and non-linear) that are also called 
layers. Each round has also a round key, derived from the original key (input 
key). The round transformation and its steps generate intermediate data called 
states. A state can be considered as a rectangular array of bytes with four rows 
and a number of columns (Nb) that depend on the size of the key length. Here, 
we consider that the key length is 128 bits, where the key is arranged in a 4x4 
matrix such that each element is a byte. The four transformations are the 
ByteSub transformation, the ShiftRow transformation, the MixColumn 
transformation and the AddRoundKey transformation. These four transformations 
compose a round. The four transformations are discussed next. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE AES ALGORITHM 
The AES algorithm can be separated in two stages—the encryption and 
the decryption process. The algorithm for the encryption process includes four 
transformations, as it is shown below. The algorithm for the decryption process 
consists of the inverses of the above-mentioned transformations in the reverse 
order. 
1. Encryption Process 
The sequence of the four transformations mentioned above is the 
following: ByteSub, ShiftRow, MixColumn and AddRoundKey transformations. 
We next present these transformations in order. 
a. The ByteSub Transformation (BS) 
This is the only non-linear part of the algorithm and assures 
resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks [2]. This transformation 
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consists of an S-box, which is applied to each byte element of the state (16-byte 
block) independently and has three different steps: inversion, a Galois Field (GF) 
linear mapping, and S-Box constant ,as it is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   The ByteSub step, the first stage in a round of AES  (From [7]). 
(1) Inversion. In this operation of the S-box, the inverse is 
computed in the 8-bit Galois Field, GF(28). The byte 00000000 has no inverse 
and 00000000 is used in place of its inverse. Assume that the first byte is 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0x x x x x x x x . The byte, which comes up from the inversion, will be 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0y y y y y y y y , which represents an eight element column vector, with the 
rightmost binary bit 0y  in the top position. This operation provides resistance 
against the linear and differential cryptanalysis attacks [1]. 
(2) GF—Linear Mapping. At this point, the y  vector is 
multiplied by a constant matrix, and the column vector (0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1) is added, 
yielding a vector 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0z z z z z z z z : (Note: Galois addition is equivalent to bitwise 










1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1









                                                                     

 
(3) S-box Table. The byte z  is the input to the S-box 
table. Consider an input byte abcdefgh. The S-box is a 16x16 matrix. We look for 
the entry at abcd row and efgh column (rows and columns are numbered from 0 
to 15). The intersection of these two entries, transformed into a binary number, is 
the output from the S-box. For example, if the figure 10101010 is the input byte, 
the first four bits, 1010, represent the decimal 10. Therefore, one enters at the 
eleventh row and eleventh column. The intersection is 172, as it is shown in 
Figure 2. This is converted into binary, which is 10101100. This is shown as ‘ac,’ 




Figure 2.   S-Box in the encryption process  (From [3]). 
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In order to make clear the hexadecimal notation, Table 2 
shows the correspondence between decimal, binary and hexadecimal notations. 
 
Decimal Binary Hexadecimal 
0 0000 0 
1 0001 1 
2 0010 2 
3 0011 3 
4 0100 4 
5 0101 5 
6 0110 6 
7 0111 7 
8 1000 8 
9 1001 9 
10 1010 A 
11 1011 B 
12 1100 C 
13 1101 D 
14 1110 E 
15 1111 F 
Table 2.   Correspondence between decimal, binary and hexadecimal notations. 
b. The ShiftRows Transformation (SR) 
In this transformation, which is linear, the rows of each state are 
cyclically shifted to the left, with each row shifted a different amount, as it 
appears in Figure 3. This provides resistance against truncated differential and 
saturation attacks [2]. For example, row zero is shifted by C0 bytes, row 1 is 
shifted by C1 bytes, row 2 is shifted by C2 bytes in such a way that the byte at 
position j in row i moves to position (j-Ci) mod Nb. Particularly in AES 0 0C  , 
1 1C  , 2 2C   and 3 3C  . The output of this transformation is a matrix with the 
same dimensions as the input matrix. 
 8
 
Figure 3.   The ShiftRows step, the second stage in a round of AES  (From 
[7]). 
c. The MixColumns Transformation (MC) 
This transformation operates on each 4-byte column separately and 
is omitted in the last round. It is also a linear transformation, which has diffusion 
power. The columns of the state are considered as polynomials over GF(28), 
which are multiplied by a fixed polynomial c(x) modulo (x4+1). This polynomial is:  
3 2( ) 03 01 01 02c x x x x        [2] 
and this multiplication can be presented as a matrix multiplication [2] (in 






02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03





                         
 [2] 




Figure 4.   The MixColumns step, the third stage in a round of AES  (From [7]). 
d. The AddRoundKey Transformation 
In this transformation, a key, consisting of 128 bits, which are 
arranged in a 4x4 byte matrix, is added to the output of the MixColumn 
transformation. A different round key is added to the state at the end of each 
round. 
 
Figure 5.   The AddRoundKey step, the fourth stage in a round of AES (From 
[7]). 
This key is derived recursively from the original key as follows. We 
will see this procedure in five steps. 
Step1: Label the first four columns of the original key W(0), W(1), 
W(2), W(3).  
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Since the whole algorithm consists of 10 rounds, 40 more columns 
are required, four for each round. Let i  symbolizes the number of column in the 
different round keys as the columns are derived from the key schedule 
( 4 43i  ).  
Step 2: If the number of the new column is a multiple of four, 
then… 
Step 3: It is       4 1W i W i T W i    , where   1T W i   is the 
transformation of  1W i   obtained as follows. Assume that the elements of the 
column  1W i   are a,b,c,d. These are shifted cyclically to obtain b,c,d,a, and 
then, at this point, each of these bytes is substituted with its corresponding byte 
from the S-box of the ByteSub transformation, as it is explained above. So, four 
other bytes result, i.e., e,f,g,h.  
Step 4: Finally, the round constant 
   4 /400000010 ir i   
is computed in GF(28). So, the   1T W i   is the column vector   , , ,e r i f g h . 
 
  Step 5: If i is not a multiple of four, then 
     4 1W i W i W i    . 
2. Decryption Process 
The decryption process consists of the inverses of the four encryption 
steps: InvByteSub, InvShiftRows, InvMixColumns and invAddRoundkey. 
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a. The InvByteSub Transformation 
This transformation consists of the inverse S-box. In essence, in 
this step, the inverse transformation of the equation that was made in the 










0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0









                                                                     

 
The inverse of the S-box appears in Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6.   S-Box in the decryption process  (From [3]). 
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b. The InvShiftRows Transformation 
In this transformation, the opposite shifting operation is applied. 
Therefore, the rows are shifted to the right instead of to the left, which takes 
place at the ShiftRows transformation. 
c. The InvMixColumns Transformation 
In this transformation, every column is multiplied by the inverse 
polynomial of c(x) (mod x4+1) which is: 
  3 20 0 09 0d x B x D x x E        
The inverse matrix multiplication of the equation, which was used in the 





0 0 0 09
09 0 0 0
0 09 0 0
0 0 09 0
b aE B D
b aE B D
b aD E B
b aB D E
                         
 
This transformation is omitted in the last round. 
d. The InvAddRoundKey Transformation 
This transformation applies the keys that were used in the 
encryption process in the reverse order. 
E. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
A common method to break a cipher is called “the brute force attack.” In 
this method, one tries to break a cipher using one or more ciphertexts, where the 
corresponding plaintexts are known, by trying to decrypt them using all the 
possible keys for the cipher. When the decryption yields the known plaintext, we 
have found the key and the cipher is broken. (A variation on this method, used 
when the plaintexts are not known, stops when a meaninful plaintext is found). 
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However, as ciphers become more and more complicated, this method 
turned out to be useless. For example, in the case of the Rijndael’s algorithm, 
one has to try at most 1282  possible keys to break the cipher. This is impractical, 
since the time and the memory that are necessary for that exceed the limits of all 
existing workstations. 
In the last few decades, some cryptanalysis has been based on algebraic 
attacks. Algebraic attacks have the advantage that a cryptanalyst does not need 
to have many known plaintexts and ciphertexts in order to create an equation 
that can describe the cipher, an event that happens with the linear or differential 
cryptanalysis where one has to have many pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts in 
order to be able to describe the cipher. 
In this thesis, a specific algebraic attack method—the Multiple Right Hand 
Side (MRHS) Linear Equations method—is examined and compared with other 
older methods (Buchburgers, F4, F5) [4]. In addition, a small-scale variant of the 
AES will be examined, since, as it will be explained later, the number of the 
variables for the whole AES algorithm is too big to be solved. 
Therefore, in Chapter II we will briefly summarize these older algebraic 
methods. While these methods can represent the AES, they cannot break the 
cipher. A more detailed analysis of the MRHS Linear Equations method will also 
be presented with a very simple example in order to show how this method 
works. 
In Chapter III, we will present the computational experiments, where we 
apply the MRHS approach to small variants of AES, including several that have 
never been attacked before by this method. We present the results of the 
application of this method with two representative examples. In the first example, 
the method fails to solve the algebraic system that is created with the MRHS 
Linear Equations, while in the second one we conclude to a solution.   
 
 14
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II. ALGEBRAIC EQUATIONS FOR AES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are many different ways to describe a cipher. However, the 
complexity of modern ciphers requires knowledge of their algebraic 
representation in order to attack and break them. In particular, one tries to 
describe a cipher by finding the algebraic properties that it has and, after that, by 
creating some homomorphisms or isomorphisms of this cipher. These new 
structures are very helpful, both to the implementers of a particular cipher who 
want to provide further protection to the cipher against side-channel attacks, and 
to the cryptanalysts who try to analyze it or even to break it. 
B. DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONS OVER F2 AND F256 
The meaning of F2 is the finite field with order (number of elements) 
12np  , where p is always a prime number and n is a positive integer. 
Respectively, F256 is the finite field with order 82 256np   , which is also notated 
GF(28).  
After the adoption of the modern algorithms, one of which is the Rijndael’s 
algorithm, a great interest was created for the wider application of computational 
algebra in cryptography. Therefore, a number of different algebraic 
representations were developed. 
In the case of AES, one can consider a number of different 
representations, which are called dual ciphers depending on the properties of 
their representation mappings. Some are described in the next pages. 
1. Isomorphic Representations 
Definition: Suppose A  is a vector space over a field F  with a 
multiplication operation A A A  . If this multiplication operation is associative 
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and is a bilinear mapping on the vector space A , then A  is an (associative) F -
algebra, or, more simply, an algebra[4]. 
In these ciphers, the mappings of the state and key spaces are algebra 
isomorphisms of the AES state space algebra, where algebra is defined below. 
Therefore, these ciphers are isomorphic to the AES. 
In AES, each byte can be considered as an element of the finite field 
 82GF  in terms of the following polynomial: 
  8 4 3 1m x x x x x      (Rijndael polynomial) 
which is irreducible in  2 [ ]GF x . This finite field can be constructed in many 
different ways from the chain of its subfields, as it appears below: 
       2 4 82 2 2 2GF GF GF GF    
In total, there are      30 1 60 3 120 1 6 120 1170         different 
isomorphic representations of the AES based on the different irreducible 
polynomials of the  82GF  subfields as they appear in Table 3 [4]. 
 
 Subfield 
Degree GF (2) GF (22) GF (24) 
2 1 6 120 
4 3 60 - 
8 30 - - 
Table 3.   The number of irreducible polynomials over subfields of GF (28). 
These particular representations are not of cryptanalytic interest. Rather, 
they are intended to improve the efficiency of hardware implementation. 
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2. Regular Representations 
The regular representation is the algebra homomorphism  : nv A M K  
that maps a A  to the matrix corresponding to the linear transformation z az , 
where z  is a vector over F  of length n  [4]. 
3. Logarithmic Representations 
Since an element of a finite field can be represented with logarithmic 
functions instead of vector spaces, an element of the AES state space (excluding 
zero bytes) can be described as an element of the set  16255 . These ciphers are 
called log dual ciphers and there are 128 different primitive elements in F , giving 
128 such representations [4]. More details of how to specify a logarithmic 
representation of the AES are given in [8]. 
C. ALGEBRAIC SOLUTION METHODS 
In this subsection, some algebraic solution methods will be discussed. The 
first two will be based on the Gröbner basis algorithms, which are well-known 
methods for the solution of multivariate polynomial equations. These two 
algorithms have been unable to break the Rijndael algorithm, and at the end of 
this chapter there will be a comparison between these algorithms and the MRHS 
Linear Equation algorithm in terms of their complexities [4]. The last one, which is 
examined and analyzed in this thesis with more details, is a new approach that 
seems to have better results than the previous two based on the time that is 
needed in order to break the AES cipher.  
1. Buchberger’s Algorithm 
As mentioned above, Buchberger’s algorithm solves systems of 
multivariate polynomial equations. Consider a polynomial ring  1 2, ,..., nx x x  with  
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a monomial ordering. Suppose  1 2, ,..., nI x x x   is an ideal of this ring with a 
basis  1,..., mF f f . The S-polynomial of any pair of the function of the basis is 
defined as: 
             
, ,
,
i j i j
i j i j
i j
lcm LM f LM f lcm LM f LM f
S f f f f
LT f LT f
             
, 
where lcm is the least common multiple, LM is the Leading Monomial, and LT is 
the Leading Term. What one tries to achieve with this polynomial S , which 
belongs to the ideal I , is to cancel the leading terms from any pair of the 
polynomials and, with the help of the next theorem, to compute a Gröbner basis 
of the ideal I [4]. 
Theorem: Let  1 2, ,..., nx x x  be a polynomial ring with a monomial ordering, and 
let I  be an ideal of  1 2, ,..., nx x x . A basis  1,..., mG f f  for the ideal I  is a 
Gröbner basis for I  if and only if every S -polynomial  ,i jS f f  of pairs of distinct 
polynomials ,i jf f G  has remainder 0 upon division by G . 
Consider an example of how to solve a multivariate polynomial system by 
using this algorithm. 
Example: Consider a polynomial ring F[x,y] with multivariate polynomials 
(with two variables) over the complex numbers with the lexicographic order 
 y x . The ideal in this particular example is generated from the polynomials 
that appear below: 
2
1 1f x y   and 22f xy x   
Here, the Gröbner basis is computed by using the Buchburger’s algorithm. Set 
 1 2,G f f  and compute the  1 2,S f f -polynomial.  
     2 2 2 22 21 2 2 2, 1x y x yS f f x y xy xx y xy     
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   2 2 21y x y x xy x x y       
The leading term of the  1 2,S f f  is 2x . The leading term of 1f  and 2f  is 2x y  and 
2xy , respectively. So,  1 2,S f f  cannot be reduced by these two polynomials. The 
G  is expanded, so that it becomes  1 2 3, ,G f f f  where 23f x y   and  1 3,S f f  
and  2 3,S f f  are computed. 
  21 3, 1S f f y  , which cannot be reduced by the set  1 2 3, ,G f f f . So the set  
 1 2 3 4, , ,G f f f f  is expanded, where 24 1f y  . 
  2 32 3,S f f x y   . Its leading term is 2x  which is divisible by the  3LT f .  The 
division of  2 3,S f f  by 3f  and then by 4f  results in: 
   2 3 32 3 3 3 4,S f f x y f y y f yf           
Now,  1 4 3,S f f f ,  2 4, 0S f f   and  3 4 3 4,S f f f yf   are also computed. Thus, 
one concludes that all these S-polynomials can be reduced by G. So, 
 1 2 3 4, , ,G f f f f  is a Gröbner basis of the ideal I . The reduced Gröbner basis is 
 2 2, 1G x y y   . Finally, the following system of equations is solved in order to 








   
The complete solution of this system is         1,1 , 1,1 , , 1 , , 1i i    . 
2. F4 and F5 Algorithms 
These two algorithms have their names from their creator, Jean Charles 
Faugere, and compute again a Gröbner basis. They can be viewed as an 
improved method of Buchburger’s algorithm. They are based on the same 
principles. In particular, the F4 algorithm instead of polynomial reduction uses 
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matrix reduction, while F5 uses matrix reduction, but each of these generated 
matrices is of full rank. This method is illustrated in the next example [4]. 
Example: Consider the polynomial ring  , ,R x y z , which includes 
polynomials with three variables in lexicographic order. We want to reduce the 
following polynomials: 
3
1 3 5f x yz xy   and 2 22 5 3 1f x z xy    
by the set of polynomials  1 2,g g , where 
1 2g xy z   and 22 3g x z yz  . 
To reduce 1f , with respect to  1 2,g g , the following reduction is performed: 
3
1 3 5f x yz xy   
                     2 2 2 16 5 3x z xy x z g    
                                       2 2 1 25 18 3 6xy yz x z g z g      
                                                  2 2 1 2 118 10 3 6 5yz z x z g z g g      
So, 1f  is reduced with respect to  1 2,g g  to 218 10yz z . 
The same procedure for 2f  is 
2 2
2 5 3 1f x z xy    
                  2 23 15 1 5xy yz z g     
                              2 2 115 6 1 5 3yz z z g g      
Thus 2f  is reduced to 
215 6 1yz z   with respect to  1 2,g g . 
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The idea behind the F4 and F5 algorithms is to make these reductions as a 
matrix reduction. However, the reduction for both 1f  and 2f  requires reduction 
only with respect to  2 1x z g , 1g , and   2z g . Therefore, a matrix of coefficients is 
created.  













         
3 0 0 5 0 0
0 5 0 3 0 1
1 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 2 0
0 1 3 0 0 0
        
 
The reduction steps correspond to the row reduction of the first two rows, 
which represent the polynomials 1 2,f f  using the last three rows, which represent 
the    2 1 1 2, ,x z g g z g  polynomials. So, as a result of the reduction, the following 
matrix is derived. 
 













          
0 0 18 0 10 0
0 0 15 0 6 1
1 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 2 0
0 1 3 0 0 0
        
 
The first two rows of the reduced matrix give the reduction of 1 2,f f  with respect 
to 1 2,g g . Note, that this is the same result that was achieved with the 
Buchburger’s reduction. 
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3. Multiple Right Hand Sides (MRHS) Linear Equations Algorithm 
A different approach of algebraic attack not based on equations of 
polynomials will be examined. This presentation will utilize a special type of 
equation known as Multiple Right Hand Side Linear Equations. 
 
Definitions: 
1. A set of small-scale Variants of the AES denoted by SR(n,r,c,e) are 
defined, where 
 n is the number of rounds, 
 r is the number of rows in the rectangular arrangement of the input, 
 c is the number of columns in the rectangular arrangement of the 
output, 
 e is the number of bits in a “word.” 
Since we consider that e=8, the underlying finite field is GF(28) and all the 
matrices and vectors are over GF(2). 
2. Let X be a set of Boolean variables represented as a column 
vector. An equation of the form 
1 2, ,..., sAX a a a  
or 
 :i i iS A X L  
is called an MRHS system of linear equations if A is a matrix of 
size kxn and rank k and 1 2, ,..., sa a a  are column vectors of length k.  
 
3. A symbol S=(X,L) consists of an ordered set of variables X=X(S) 
and a list L=L(S) of Right Hand Sides [9] 
a. Agreeing Procedure 
One of the problems with applying algebraic attacks in a cipher is 
the difficulty of presenting practical examples, because the required time and 
memory requirements grow beyond the limitations of a typical workstation. 
Therefore, only small-scale variants of the different ciphers were performed. 
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After the completion of the rounds of AES, one can count the 
number of variables there are in the system in order to determine the algebraic 
equations that can describe the system. 
For example, the total number of variables for the AES, assuming 
8-bit words, is given by the following formula: 
8 8 8( 1)rc nr n rc    
Thus, for a complete AES the number of variables is 1600. This is large, if one 
wants to solve a system with so many non-linear polynomial equations. 
Figure 7 shows the bytes that are variables in a small-scale variant 
of the AES.  
 
 
Figure 7.   SR(3,4,4,8) equations variables (From [9]). 
The variables can be separated in two different categories. The first 
one includes all the bits that are derived after each S-box, except the last one 
that is considered as known, since the ciphertext is considered as a known for 
this algorithm. The second one is the 16 bytes of the initial key and after that, 
only the first column of each expansion key, since the first column is derived with 
the contribution of the S-box, while the three others are dependent on the first 
column, as it is shown in Figure 7 and described in the AddRoundKey 
transformation in Chapter I. 
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Consider two symbols: 
 :i i iS A X L   and  :j j jS A X L     
The matrices Li are of size kixsi. These symbols are derived from 
the bits that go in and out of each S-box, which are expressed as linear 
combinations of the variables. 
These two symbols agree if, for any 1 ia L , there exists an 2 ja L  









        
 
is consistent, and, conversely, for any  2 ja L , there exists an 1 ia L  such that 
the linear system is consistent. The steps for the application of this attack are as 
follows: 










              
 with  i jt k k   rows. 
 Choose a nonsingular transform matrix U of size t t  such that the 
product UA  is a matrix with zeros in its last r rows. If r=0, then the 
symbols agree. 
 If r>0, then compute the matrices ijUT  and  jiUT . Let Prij  denotes 
the set of ijUT -column projections to the last r coordinates. If 
Pr Prij ji  the symbols agree. 
 If Pr Prij ji  then remove the columns from iL  whose image is not 
found in Pr Prij ji  and, similarly, the columns from jL  whose image 
is not found in  Pr Prij ji . One concludes with two new symbols 
whose equations are ' ':i i iS A X L     and ' ':j j jS A X L    . 
This procedure is repeated up to the point that all symbols agree. When the 
agreeing procedure is applied in a pair of symbols Si and Sj and the procedure is 
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continued with other symbols in the system, for example, kS , it is possible that 
the Si and Sk will disagree. This means that Si and Sj may disagree again after Si 
and Sk agree. So, the previous agreements have to be run through again and 
again. 
b. Gluing Procedure 
After the completion of the agreeing procedure, one may conclude 
that the system of equations does not have a solution. Therefore, a way to start 
the agreeing procedure again must be found. Here is where the gluing procedure 
comes into play. This method merges two symbols into one, bringing their joint 
information in the new symbol. The agreeing procedure is applied again with the 
new symbols, and is repeated until a unique solution is reached. The following 
example demonstrates how this works. Also, this step increases the complexity 
of the attack. 
c. Example 
1. Agreeing Procedure. We have two equations 






1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0






                        






0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0






                        
 
By following the previously described procedure, the matrix A is: 
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
A
          
. 
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A non-singular matrix U for the transformation of A is: 
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
U
          
. 
So,  
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
UA





1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
T
          
  and  21
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
T




1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
UT
          
  and 21
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1
UT





Looking at the last two rows of the above matrices, one defines: 
Pr12={(1,1),(1,0),(0,1)}, Pr21={(1,1),(0,0),(0,1)} 
Pr12∩Pr21={(1,1),(0,1)} 
One can observe that the second and the fourth column of 12UT  do not match 
with any column of 21UT . Therefore, these columns are removed. Similarly, the 
second and the third column of 21UT  should be removed for the same reason. 






1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0






                        






0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0






                        
 
that now agree. 
2. Gluing Procedure. Let B be the sub-matrix of UA in its 
last t-r nonzero rows. The gluing of the two previously agreed symbols is BX=[L], 
where each column of L is the sum of one column from UT12 and one from the 
UT21 with the same projection in its last r coordinates, reduced to the first t-r 
rows. 






1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1






                           
 
This MRHS system of linear equations contains the information of the first two 
different symbols. 
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d. From MRHS to Linear Equations 
In order to derive the ordinary linear equations (unique right hand 
side) from the MRHS linear equations, the L matrix is triangulated with a row 
transformation. An upper-triangular matrix with zeros in its last r1≥0 rows is 
sought, from where to take r1 homogeneous equations. There may also be non-
homogeneous equations with ones in the whole row of L. In the above example, 







1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0






                           
, 
which is equivalent with the three following linear equations and the two initial 














4. Algorithms’ Complexities and Comparison 
This section compares the complexities of the previously described 
algorithms.  
The Buchberger’s algorithm time complexity is related to the total degree 
of all the intermediate polynomials that are generated by the algorithm. In 
essence, this algorithm can have double exponential complexity. In particular, 
considering the AES equation system over  82GF , the complexity of 
Buchburger’s algorithm is, at worst, single exponential [4]. 
The F4 and F5 algorithms are different approaches for the computation of a 
Gröbner basis. Since the Buchberger’s algorithm involves polynomial reductions, 
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which take place sequentially, while F4 and F5 use matrix reductions, it seems 
logical that F4 and F5 will be faster. The F5 algorithm is even better than the F4 
because it uses only full rank matrices. 
The complexity of the MRHS algorithm is very difficult to specify since the 
different parameters that can be used, such as the number of rounds, the 
number of rows and columns, etc, make it very complicated. However, this 
algorithm seems to be much better than the previous ones, since the required 
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III. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will explain how the MRHS method was applied by using 
different equations that were generated with the code shown in Appendix B.  The 
parameters of this small-scale variant of AES were determined: the number of 
rounds (0<Nr<10), the number of the rows and the columns in the rectangular 
arrangement of the input (0<Nb<4), and the number of bits in each word (2, 4, 8). 
In addition, a random plaintext and an initial key were chosen, which have 
lengths that correspond to the number of columns and rows of the states and 
with the number of bits in the words as well. These texts are expressed in 
hexadecimal notation. After that, the MRHS Linear Equations method was used 
to try to solve this system. 
Initially, the agreeing procedure was implemented to see if some linear 
equations could be extracted just by applying this procedure. If the number of 
linear equations that resulted was equal to the number of variables in the system, 
then the procedure would be stopped since there would be a unique solution for 
the system. If the number of linear equations extracted from the agreeing 
procedure was less than the number of variables, the gluing procedure was 
performed, in which the maximum number of Right Hand Sides (RHS) in the 
glued equations is specified.  Then another attempt was made to extract some 
linear equations.  In order to have a unique solution, it is necessary to have a 
sum of linear equations equal to the number of variables. 
B.  RESULTS 
Some simple examples of the procedure described above are shown 
below. 
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1. Example 1 
In this example, a system was created with two rounds, two rows and two 
columns, in the rectangular arrangement of the input and 2-bit words. The 
system has also a plaintext fa (in hexadecimal notation), which corresponds to 
11111010 in binary notation, and a key ea (in hexadecimal notation), which 
corresponds to 11101010 in binary notation. The system of equations appears 
below, starting with the number of bit variables and the number of MRHS 
equations. Each MRHS equation appears as the number of rows, the number of 
RHS, the rows of Ai and the columns of Li. The first four symbols are from the key 
schedule, the next four from round 1, and the last four from round 2. 
  24  12 















































































































now: neq = 12 ; nlink = 0 ; linbank = 0 
 
Let us explain the above shown result. The “neq” is the number of MRHS 
Linear Equations we have up to that point. The “linbank” (linear bank) is the 
notation, which shows the number of the ordinary linear equations that have 
extracted after the application of the agreeing or gluing procedures. 
The above system has at the beginning 24 variables combined in 12 
MRHS linear equations. Before the application of the agreeing procedure, we 
cannot extract any ordinary linear equation. That is why we see in the above 
result that we have 0 number of linear equation in our linear bank (linbank).  
This system of equations was used as input in the code “mrhs,” which is 
shown in Appendix B. After the agreeing procedure, we conclude with zero 
MRHS linear equations and 22 new ordinary linear equations, which appear 
below. 
                     0 +   8 +  20 +  21 +  23 = 0 
   0 +   1 +   2 +   8 +   9 +  10 +  21 +  22 = 0 
                                            21 = 0 
                                 2 +  10 +  20 = 0 
                     1 +   2 +   9 +  10 +  19 = 0 
                                 0 +   8 +  18 = 0 
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                     0 +   2 +   8 +  10 +  17 = 0 
                                 0 +   8 +  16 = 0 
                                            15 = 0 
         0 +   1 +   2 +   8 +   9 +  10 +  14 = 0 
                     0 +   2 +   8 +  10 +  13 = 0 
                     1 +   2 +   9 +  10 +  12 = 0 
                     1 +   2 +   9 +  10 +  11 = 0 
                                 2 +   8 +  10 = 0 
                     0 +   1 +   2 +   8 +   9 = 0 
                                             8 = 1 
                                       2 +   7 = 0 
                                       0 +   6 = 0 
                                             5 = 0 
                                             4 = 0 
                                 0 +   2 +   3 = 0 
                                             1 = 0 
now: neq = 0 ; nlink = 0 ; linbank = 22 
The numbers that appear in the above system of ordinary linear equations 
represent the number of the variable in our initial system, i.e., 0. 


























The last row represents the Right Hand Side, which has only 22 elements, 
meaning that there are two free variables. The same thing can be easily 
observed from the reduced matrix of the coefficients of the variables. That 
particular system cannot have a unique solution. The possible solutions of this 




































Therefore, the variables x0 and x2 are free variables, as it is appeared in 
the code above. Additionally, we have a depiction of the four different solutions at 
the end, which means that this particular system has four different keys for one 
plaintext and ciphertext. In that example, where we have a small-scale variant of 
the AES with two rounds, two rows and two columns in the rectangular 
arrangement of the input and two-bit words, the algorithm cannot give a unique 
solution.  
This is a surprising result, as we mentioned in the introduction. We have a 
specific plaintext, which is encrypted by using a specific key. In our attempt to 
break the algorithm and to extract the initial plaintext from the ciphertext, we 
expect to recover the initial key. Instead, solving the system of the MRHS Linear 
Equations, we found four different keys that can decrypt that ciphertext to get the 
correct plaintext. 
One thing that one could suppose is that some other linear equations 
could be extracted in order to solve this problem, by applying a different plaintext 
with the same key. At first glance, it can be seen that the ordinary linear 
equations are different from the previous ones. However, if the matrix of the 
coefficients of the variables is reduced, we conclude exactly in the same set of 
linear equations as before. Therefore, such a system has a non-unique solution. 
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2. Example 2 
The second example is one with a unique solution. The parameters of this 
system are one round, two rows, and two columns in the rectangular 
arrangement of the input and four bit words. 
The system, which appears below, has 24 variables and six MRHS linear 
equations. Therefore, in order to end up with a unique solution, it is necessary to 
find 24 ordinary linear equations. 
  24  6 


























































































































































now: neq = 6 ; nlink = 0 ; linbank = 0 
 
In this case, we tried to extract some ordinary linear equations directly 
from the initial system of the six MRHS Linear Equations, without any result. After 
the agreeing algorithm is applied, there is still no linear equation in the linear 
bank. As we said before, “linbank” (Linear bank) is the name of the place in the 
computer program where all the ordinary linear equations, that are extracted from 
the different procedures, are saved. This means that many times the agreeing 
procedure has no result, if it is applied alone in such a system of MRHS Linear 
Equations. Here is where the gluing procedure is performed. In this particular 
example, we observe that exactly 24 different ordinary linear equations are 
extracted, which are shown below. 
 
 
         4 +  23 = 0 
         4 +  22 = 0 
         4 +  21 = 0 
         4 +  20 = 0 
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              19 = 0 
        17 +  18 = 0 
              17 = 0 
              16 = 0 
         4 +  15 = 0 
              14 = 0 
         4 +  13 = 0 
              12 = 0 
         4 +  11 = 0 
              10 = 0 
         4 +   9 = 0 
         4 +   8 = 0 
   4 +   6 +   7 = 0 
         4 +   6 = 0 
               5 = 0 
         3 +   4 = 0 
               3 = 1 
               2 = 0 
               1 = 0 
               0 = 0 
now: neq = 0 ; nlink = 0 ; linbank = 24 
As we mentioned before, we conclude in zero MRHS Linear Equations 
and 24 ordinary linear equations (“linbank=24”). 
In a matrix form, these are: 
24  0 
 linear eqs (24): 





























































There are no free variables. Therefore, it is a unique solution, as it 
appears above. 
From the two examples above, we saw how the algebraic attack method 
of MRHS Linear Equations works. The many experiments that were tested for 
this thesis were mostly successful for a small variant of the AES. The parameters 
of the system that were used were at most four rounds, with four rows and 




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This work has shown that the new method of breaking the Rijndael 
algorithm with the algebraic representation of a system with Multiple Right Hand 
Sides linear equations is quite effective. It is comparatively effective because by 
using other algebraic methods, such as the Buchberger’s and the F4 – F5 
algorithms, it was impossible to find a solution for some very simple systems. In 
particular, a small version of the AES with 5 rounds and 1 row and 1 column in 
the rectangular arrangement of the input, could not be solved with the older 
algebraic methods [5]. Moreover, a system with 4 rounds and 1 row and 1 
column in the rectangular arrangement of the input, took 20286.18 seconds to be 
solved by the standard algebraic methods [5]. The MRHS method solved this 
problem in only 0.032 seconds [5].  
In Chapter II, we saw that the new method seems to be much better than 
the other algebraic methods in terms of complexity. As mentioned before, due to 
the different parameters that this algorithm can have, (different number of 
rounds, rows and columns) it is very complicated to specify an exact complexity. 
According to the real parameters of the AES, our test cannot be considered very 
realistic, since the values of the parameters of the original AES are bigger. 
Nevertheless, by comparing the complexities in terms of the time consumed for a 
small-scale variant to be solved, we conclude that it is worthwhile to further 
develop and improve this method. 
The AES, as we explained in the beginning, is a standard in order to 
secure federal information. With MRHS Linear Equations, we concluded that we 
can break a small-scale variant of this system. We cannot say that the AES is at 
risk, but we can say for sure that this new method gives new perspectives in the 
field of cryptanalysis that may put the AES algorithm at risk. 
For example, one new detail in this thesis, is the application of our codes 
in many different experiments with different parameters. In particular, instead of 
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the 8-bit field that professors Håvard Raddum and Igor Semaev used, we 
executed some experiments in the 2-bit and 4-bit fields, that is original. From 
that, we discovered a result very important in terms of cryptanalysis. There are 
some cases where (a small variant of) the Rijndael algorithm can have multiple 
solutions. We demonstrated that in the 2-bit field. However, it may be valid 
though more difficult of course, even in the 8-bit field, which might reduce the 
effectiveness of the algorithm. This means that we may have to be cautious 
when we choose the encryption keys, because multiple decryption keys would 
make it easier to break the algorithm and further to decrypt and reveal important 
federal information. 
In conclusion, our first goal was to create the code, which could solve a 
small-scale variant of the AES. Based on the codes of Professors Raddum and 
Semaev, we reached this point. In a few cases, a unique solution of a small-scale 
variant of the AES resulted. However, the small AES algorithm has some 
weaknesses, which consist of the fact that some systems cannot uniquely be 
solved, even if different plaintexts with the same initial key are applied. 
The complexity of this algorithm is the area that needs to be improved in 
future research. The reduction of the complexity by a significant factor could 
upgrade the MRHS algorithm to a very effective algebraic attack method against 
new very strong cryptographic algorithms. This reduction could be achieved by 
reducing either the number of the agreeings between the symbols or the 
numbers of gluings which adds more complexity in the whole algorithm. One way 
to achieve that could be the simultaneous agreeing of more than two symbols, 
which may require a smaller number of necessary gluings for the extraction of 
the ordinary linear equations. In that way, we could break an AES algorithm with 
parameters of greater value. 
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APPENDIX A 
(These codes are only intended for experiments with the MRHS method, 
and neither their author nor the author of this thesis takes any responsibility for 
their use) 





typedef unsigned int u32; 
typedef unsigned char u8; 
 
#define MAXINT 2147483647 
#define EPSILON 0.001 
#define log2(x) ( 1.442695040888963407359924681 * log(x) )  // !! 
changed for bcc - DC 
 




















  4,5,5,6,5,6,6,7,5,6,6,7,6,7,7,8}; 
 
struct bitVector{ 
  u32 *v; 




  int nlin, nrhs, nw, nn, eqnr, originalNRHS; 
  u32 **A, **b, **coverID; 
  u8 *RHSexists, delSinceExtract; 





  int ncells, *nCover[2], linknr; 
  struct eqSymbol *nlist[2]; 
  struct bitVector *cellID; 




  int neq, nlink; 
  struct eqSymbol *E, *linbank; 
  struct linkSymbol *L; 
}; 
 
int ww(u32 *word, int n){ 
  int i, j, w=0; 
 
  for(i=0; i<n; ++i){ 
    w+=weight[word[i]&0xff]; 
    w+=weight[(word[i]>>8)&0xff]; 
    w+=weight[(word[i]>>16)&0xff]; 
    w+=weight[word[i]>>24]; 
  } 
 
  return w; 
} 
 
double averageNRHS(struct system *S){ 
  int i, totnrhs=0; 
 
  if(S->neq==0) 
    return 0.0; 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i) 
    totnrhs+=S->E[i].nrhs; 
 
  return (double)(totnrhs)/(double)(S->neq); 
} 
 
int smallestSetBit(u32 *M, int ncw){ 
  int j=0, m=0; 
  u32 w; 
 
  while(j<ncw && !M[j]){ 
    j++; 
    m+=32; 
  } 
  if(j==ncw) 
    return -1; 
  w=M[j]; 
  for(j=4; j>=0; --j){ 
    if(!(w&((1<<(1<<j))-1))){ 
      m+=(1<<j); 
      w>>=(1<<j); 
    } 
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  } 
 
  return m; 
} 
 
int largestSetBit(u32 *M, int ncw){ 
  int j, m; 
  u32 w; 
 
  j=ncw-1; 
  m=(ncw<<5)-1; 
  while(j>=0 && !M[j]){ 
    j--; 
    m-=32; 
  } 
  if(j==-1) 
    return -1; 
  w=M[j]; 
  for(j=4; j>=0; --j){ 
    if(!(w&(((1<<(1<<j))-1)^0xffffffff)))//no set bit in upper remaning 
half 
      m-=(1<<j); 
    else 
      w>>=(1<<j); 
  } 
  return m; 
} 
u8 v0GreaterThanV1(struct bitVector v0, struct bitVector v1){ 
  int i; 
 
  if(v0.length!=v1.length)printf("(v0GreaterThanV1)Uncomparable bit-
strings, v0.length=%d, v1.length=%d!\n", 
     v0.length,v1.length); 
  i=v0.wl-1; 
  while(i>=0 && !(v0.v[i]^v1.v[i])) 
    i--; 
  if(i>=0 && v0.v[i]>v1.v[i]) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
u8 v0EqualV1(struct bitVector v0, struct bitVector v1){ 
  int i; 
 
  if(v0.length!=v1.length)printf("(v0EqualV1)Uncomparable bit-strings, 
v0.length=%d, v1.length=%d!\n", 
     v0.length,v1.length); 
  i=v0.wl-1; 
  while(i>=0 && !(v0.v[i]^v1.v[i])) 
    i--; 
  if(i<0) 
    return 1; 
  else 




void mergeSortBitVectors(struct bitVector *vl, int nil){ 
  int i, j, t, na, nb; 
  struct bitVector tmp, *ml, *vlb; 
 
  if(nil==1) 
    return; 
  if(nil==2){ 
    if(v0GreaterThanV1(vl[0],vl[1])){ 
      tmp=vl[0]; 
      vl[0]=vl[1]; 
      vl[1]=tmp; 
    } 
    return; 
  } 
  na=nil/2; 
  nb=nil-na; 
  vlb=vl+na; 
  mergeSortBitVectors(vl,na); 
  mergeSortBitVectors(vlb,nb); 
  ml=(struct bitVector *)malloc(nil*sizeof(struct bitVector)); 
  t=i=j=0; 
  while(i<na && j<nb){ 
    if(v0GreaterThanV1(vl[i],vlb[j])) 
      ml[t++]=vlb[j++]; 
    else 
      ml[t++]=vl[i++]; 
  }//lists merged 
  if(i<na){ 
    for(j=i; j<na; ++j) 
      ml[t++]=vl[j]; 
  } 
  else{ 
    for(i=j; i<nb; ++i) 
      ml[t++]=vlb[i]; 
  }//remainder of unfinished list copied 
  for(i=0; i<nil; ++i) 
    vl[i]=ml[i]; 
  //copied back to vl 
} 
 
void printLinComb(u32 *l, int nvar){ 
  int i; 
 
  for(i=0; i<nvar; ++i){ 
    if(l[i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f))) 
      printf("%3d + ",i); 
  } 
  printf("\b\b\n"); 
} 
 
void printEquation(struct eqSymbol *eq){ 
  /* Prints the equation to the screen, includes up to 16 righ-hand 
sides */ 
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  int i, j, maxnv=0, nv, nr, nwritten; 
 
  if(eq->nrhs>16) 
    nr=16; 
  else 
    nr=eq->nrhs; 
  for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i){ 
    nv=ww(eq->A[i],NWORDS); 
    if(nv>maxnv) 
      maxnv=nv; 
  } 
  printf("========= Equation %d ================================\n",eq-
>eqnr); 
  for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i){ 
    nv=ww(eq->A[i],NWORDS); 
    for(j=0; j<maxnv-nv; ++j) 
      printf("      "); 
    for(j=0; j<NVAR; ++j){ 
      if(eq->A[i][j>>5]&(1<<(j&0x1f))) 
 printf(" %3d +",j); 
    } 
    printf("\b="); 
    nwritten=0; 
    for(j=0; j<eq->originalNRHS; ++j){ 
      if(eq->RHSexists[j]){ 
 if(eq->b[j][i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f))) 
   printf(" 1 |"); 
 else 
   printf(" 0 |"); 
 nwritten++; 
 if(nwritten==nr) 
   j=eq->originalNRHS; 
      } 
    } 
    printf("\b\n\n"); 
  } 
  printf("%d right hand sides in total\n",eq->nrhs); 
  printf("\nLinked to %d other equations\n",eq->nn); 
  printf("RHS index - "); 
  nwritten=0; 
  for(i=0; i<eq->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eq->RHSexists[i]){ 
      printf(" %2d ",i); 
      nwritten++; 
      if(nwritten==nr) 
 i=eq->originalNRHS; 
    } 
  } 
  printf("\ncoverID"); 
  for(i=0; i<eq->nn; ++i){ 
    printf("\nLink %2d     ",i); 
    nwritten=0; 
    for(j=0; j<eq->originalNRHS; ++j){ 
      if(eq->RHSexists[j]){ 




   j=eq->originalNRHS; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  printf("\n======================================================\n"); 
} 
 
void printLink(struct linkSymbol *ls){ 
  /* Prints the link to the screen */ 
  int i, c0, c1; 
 
  printf("============== Link %d ========================\n",ls-
>linknr); 
  printf("Link with %d cells\n",ls->ncells); 
  if(ls->ncells<=32){ 
    printf("\n       "); 
    for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i) 
      printf(" %2d ",i); 
    printf("\nExists "); 
    for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i){ 
      if(ls->cellExists[i]) 
 printf("  x "); 
      else 
 printf("    "); 
    } 
    printf("\nnCover0"); 
    for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i) 
      printf(" %2d ",ls->nCover[0][i]); 
    printf("\nnCover1"); 
    for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i) 
      printf(" %2d ",ls->nCover[1][i]); 
  } 
  else{ 
    c0=ls->nCover[0][0]; 
    c1=ls->nCover[1][0]; 
    for(i=1; i<ls->ncells; ++i){ 
      if(c0!=ls->nCover[0][i] || c1!=ls->nCover[1][i]){ 
 printf("\nUnbalanced link\n"); 
 i=ls->ncells; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  printf("\n\nLinks together equations %d and %d of dimensions %d and 
%d\n", 
      ls->nlist[0]->eqnr,ls->nlist[1]->eqnr,ls->nlist[0]->nlin,ls-
>nlist[1]->nlin); 
  printf("===================================================\n"); 
} 
 
void printLinEquation(struct eqSymbol *eq, int start, int stopp){ 
  int i, j, nv, maxnv=0; // !! added init , maxnv; 
 
  for(i=start; i<stopp; ++i){ 
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    nv=ww(eq->A[i],NWORDS); 
    if(nv>maxnv) 
      maxnv=nv; 
  } 
  printf("========= Linear Equation =====================\n",eq->eqnr); 
  for(i=start; i<stopp; ++i){ 
    nv=ww(eq->A[i],NWORDS); 
    for(j=0; j<maxnv-nv; ++j) 
      printf("      "); 
    for(j=0; j<NVAR; ++j){ 
      if(eq->A[i][j>>5]&(1<<(j&0x1f))) 
 printf(" %3d +",j); 
    } 
    printf("\b="); 
    if(eq->b[0][i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f))) 
      printf(" 1\n"); 
    else 
      printf(" 0\n");   
  } 
} 
 
void deleteEquation(struct eqSymbol *eq){ 
  /* Frees all allocated memory in eq not associated to links. */ 
  int i; 
 
  for(i=0; i<eq->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eq->RHSexists[i]) 
      free(eq->b[i]); 
  } 
  free(eq->b); 
  for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i) 
    free(eq->A[i]); 
  free(eq->A); 
  free(eq->RHSexists); 
} 
 
void deleteSystem(struct system *S){ 
  int i; 
 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i) 
    deleteEquation(S->E+i); 
  deleteEquation(S->linbank); 
} 
 
void Uxb(u32 **U, int nr, int nc, u32 *b, u32 *x){ 
  /* computes U times b, where U has nr rows and nc columns.  Stores 
     result in x */ 
  int i, j, ncw, nrw; 
  u32 *w; 
 
  ncw=(nc+31)>>5; 
  nrw=(nr+31)>>5; 
  w=(u32 *)malloc(ncw*sizeof(u32)); 
  for(i=0; i<nrw; ++i) 
    x[i]=0; 
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  for(i=0; i<nr; ++i){ 
    for(j=0; j<ncw; ++j) 
      w[j]=U[i][j]&b[j]; 
    if(ww(w,ncw)&1) 
      x[i>>5]|=(1<<(i&0x1f)); 
  } 
  free(w); 
} 
 
void UAX(u32 **U, u32 **A, u32 **nyA, int nl, int ncw){ 
  /* Multiplies the matrices U and A, stores result in nyA */ 
  int i, j, k, *bpos, hw; 
 
  bpos=(int *)malloc(nl*sizeof(int)); 
  for(i=0; i<nl; ++i){ 
    hw=0; 
    for(j=0; j<nl; ++j){ 
      if(U[i][j>>5]&(1<<(j&0x1f))) 
 bpos[hw++]=j; 
    }//found positions where U[i] has 1-bits 
    for(j=0; j<ncw; ++j){ 
      for(k=0; k<hw; ++k) 
 nyA[i][j]^=A[bpos[k]][j]; 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
int rank(u32 **M, int nr, int nc){ 
  /* Returns the rank of M */ 
  int rank, i, j, k, sb, minsb, r, ncw; 
  u32 **cM, *tmp; 
 
  ncw=(nc+31)>>5; 
  cM=(u32 **)malloc(nr*sizeof(u32)); 
  for(i=0; i<nr; ++i){ 
    cM[i]=(u32 *)malloc(ncw*sizeof(u32)); 
    for(j=0; j<ncw; ++j) 
      cM[i][j]=M[i][j]; 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<nr; ++i){ 
    minsb=nc; 
    for(j=i; j<nr; ++j){ 
      sb=smallestSetBit(cM[j],ncw); 
      if(sb!=-1 && sb<minsb){ 
 r=j; 
 minsb=sb; 
      } 
    } 
    if(minsb==nc){ 
      for(j=0; j<nr; ++j) 
 free(cM[j]); 
      free(cM); 
      return i; 
    } 
    if(r>i){ 
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      tmp=cM[i]; 
      cM[i]=cM[r]; 
      cM[r]=tmp; 
    } 
    for(j=i+1; j<nr; ++j){ 
      if(cM[j][minsb>>5]&(1<<(minsb&0x1f))){ 
 for(k=0; k<ncw; ++k) 
   cM[j][k]^=cM[i][k]; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<nr; ++i) 
    free(cM[i]); 
  free(cM); 
  return nr; 
} 
 
int computeU(struct eqSymbol *eq0, struct eqSymbol *eq1, u32 **U){ 
  /* Computes U such that UM is triangularized, where M is the 
   concatenation of the matrices in eq0 and eq1.  Returns the 
   dimension of the shared subspaces of eq0 and eq1. */ 
  int i, j, k, b, minb, r, enord, uw, rank, sumnl; 
  u32 *tmp, enmask, **M; 
 
  sumnl=eq0->nlin+eq1->nlin; 
  M=(u32 **)malloc(sumnl*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<sumnl; ++i){ 
    M[i]=(u32 *)malloc(NWORDS*sizeof(u32)); 
    if(i<eq0->nlin){ 
      for(j=0; j<NWORDS; ++j) 
 M[i][j]=eq0->A[i][j]; 
    } 
    else{ 
      for(j=0; j<NWORDS; ++j) 
 M[i][j]=eq1->A[i-eq0->nlin][j]; 
    } 
  } 
  rank=sumnl; 
  uw=(sumnl+31)>>5; 
  for(i=0; i<sumnl; ++i){ 
    U[i]=(u32 *)calloc(uw,sizeof(u32)); 
    U[i][i>>5]|=(1<<(i&0x1f)); 
  } 
  //U is identity-matrix 
  for(i=0; i<sumnl; ++i){ 
    minb=MAXINT; 
    for(j=i; j<sumnl; ++j){ 
      b=smallestSetBit(M[j],NWORDS); 
      if(b!=-1 && b<minb){ 
 r=j; 
 minb=b; 
 if(minb==i)//no need to search further 
   j=sumnl; 
      } 
    } 
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    if(minb==MAXINT){//only all-zero rows remaining 
      rank=i; 
      i=sumnl; 
    } 
    else{ 







      } 
      enmask=1<<(minb&0x1f); 
      enord=minb>>5; 
      for(j=i+1; j<sumnl; ++j){//making 0's under leading 1 
 if(M[j][enord]&enmask){ 
   for(k=0; k<NWORDS; ++k) 
     M[j][k]^=M[i][k]; 
   for(k=0; k<uw; ++k) 
     U[j][k]^=U[i][k]; 
 } 
      } 
    } 
  }  
  for(i=0; i<sumnl; ++i) 
    free(M[i]); 
  free(M); 
 
  return sumnl-rank; 
} 
 
u8 checkSolution(struct system *S, u8 *val){ 
  /* Returns 1 if val is a solution to S, 0 if not. 
     Prints out the equation number of equations not satisfied. val[i] 
is assigned to variable i.*/ 
  int i, j; 
  u32 *propRHS; 
  struct eqSymbol *eq;  
  u8 bit, funnet, rv=1; 
 
 
  propRHS=(u32 *)calloc(NWORDS,sizeof(u32)); 
  for(eq=S->E; eq<S->E+S->neq; ++eq){ 
    for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i){ 
      bit=0; 
      for(j=0; j<NVAR; ++j){ 
 if(eq->A[i][j>>5]&(1<<(j&0x1f)) && val[j]) 
   bit^=1; 
      } 
      if(bit) 
 propRHS[i>>5]|=1<<(i&0x1f); 
    }//propRHS maa vaere blant eq->b 
    for(i=0; i<eq->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
      if(eq->RHSexists[i]){ 
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 funnet=1; 
 for(j=0; j<eq->nw; ++j){ 
   if(propRHS[j]^eq->b[i][j]) 
     funnet=0; 
 } 
 if(funnet) 
   i=eq->originalNRHS+1; 
      } 
    } 
    if(i==eq->originalNRHS){//eq ikke tilfredsstilt 
      printf("Equation %d not satisfied, nlin=%d, nrhs=%d\n",eq-
>eqnr,eq->nlin,eq->nrhs); 
      //printEquation(eq); 
      rv=0; 
    } 
    for(i=0; i<eq->nw; ++i) 
      propRHS[i]=0; 
  } 
  return rv; 
} 
 
u8 deleteRHS(struct eqSymbol *eq, int RHSindex){ 
  int i, minindex, ci; 
  struct linkSymbol *lS; 
 
  if(eq->RHSexists[RHSindex]==1){ 
    eq->RHSexists[RHSindex]=0; 
    free(eq->b[RHSindex]); 
    eq->nrhs--; 
    if(eq->nrhs==0) 
      return 0; 
    for(i=0; i<eq->nn; ++i){ 
      lS=eq->link[i]; 
      ci=eq->coverID[i][RHSindex]; 
      if(lS->nlist[0]==eq) 
 minindex=0; 
      else 
 minindex=1; 
      lS->nCover[minindex][ci]--; 
      if(lS->nCover[minindex][ci]<0){printLink(lS);exit(0);} 
    } 
    eq->delSinceExtract=1; 
  } 
  return 1; 
} 
 
u8 trimEquation(struct eqSymbol *eq){ 
  /* Makes sure that A-matrix in eq has full rank, and removes 
     RHS if possible.  Returns 0 if eq can not be satisfied, returns 1 
     if A-matrix had full rank, returns 2 if A-matrix has decreased. */ 
  u32 **U, *x, *tmp, enmask; 
  int i, j, k, b, minb, r, enord, uw, rank; 
  u8 rv; // !! removed var: , delocc=0; 
 
  rank=eq->nlin; 
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  uw=(eq->nlin+31)>>5; 
  U=(u32 **)malloc(eq->nlin*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i){ 
    U[i]=(u32 *)calloc(uw,sizeof(u32)); 
    U[i][i>>5]|=(1<<(i&0x1f)); 
  } 
  //U is identity-matrix 
  for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i){ 
    minb=NVAR; 
    for(j=i; j<eq->nlin; ++j){ 
      b=smallestSetBit(eq->A[j],NWORDS); 
      if(b!=-1 && b<minb){ 
 r=j; 
 minb=b; 
      } 
    } 
    if(minb==NVAR){//only all-zero rows remaining 
      rank=i; 
      i=eq->nlin; 
    } 
    else{ 







      } 
      enmask=1<<(minb&0x1f); 
      enord=minb>>5; 
      for(j=i+1; j<eq->nlin; ++j){//making 0's under leading 1 
 if(eq->A[j][enord]&enmask){ 
   for(k=0; k<NWORDS; ++k) 
     eq->A[j][k]^=eq->A[i][k]; 
   for(k=0; k<uw; ++k) 
     U[j][k]^=U[i][k]; 
 } 
      } 
    } 
  }//U is computed 
  x=(u32 *)malloc(eq->nw*sizeof(u32)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eq->RHSexists[i]){ 
      Uxb(U,eq->nlin,eq->nlin,eq->b[i],x);//x er ny RHS-vektor 
      for(j=0; j<eq->nw; ++j) 
 eq->b[i][j]=x[j]; 
      for(j=rank; j<eq->nlin; ++j){ 
 if(eq->b[i][j>>5]&(1<<(j&0x1f))){//inneholder 1-bit i 0-rad 
omraade 
   rv=deleteRHS(eq,i); 
   // !! removed var: delocc=1; 
   if(rv==0) 
     return 0; 
   j=eq->nlin; 
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 } 
      } 
    } 
  }//oppdatert alle RHS, og sikret at de er gyldige 
  if(eq->nlin==rank) 
    return 1; 
  else{ 
    eq->nlin=rank; 
    eq->nw=(eq->nlin+31)>>5; 
    return 2; 
  } 
} 
 
void depositLinComb(struct eqSymbol *eq, u32 *lc, u8 rhv){ 
  /* Adds lc=rhv to eq (the linear bank).  The bank must be 
     antitriangular, and will remain so after addition of lc=rhv. 
     lc must not be in the span of eq->A. */ 
  int i, j, vnr, insertrow=-1, libit; 
  u32 *clc; 
 
  clc=(u32 *)malloc(NWORDS*sizeof(u32)); 
  for(i=0; i<NWORDS; ++i) 
    clc[i]=lc[i]; 
  //clc er kopi og kan herjes med 
  if(eq->nlin==0) 
    insertrow=0; 
  i=0; 
  while(insertrow==-1){ 
    vnr=largestSetBit(clc,NWORDS); 
    while(i<eq->nlin && vnr<largestSetBit(eq->A[i],NWORDS)) 
      i++; 
    if(i<eq->nlin){ 
      libit=largestSetBit(eq->A[i],NWORDS); 
      if(vnr>libit) 
 insertrow=i; 
      else{//vnr==libit 
 for(j=0; j<NWORDS; ++j) 
   clc[j]^=eq->A[i][j]; 
 if(eq->b[0][i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f))) 
   rhv^=1; 
 i++; 
      } 
    } 
    else//i==eq->nlin 
      insertrow=eq->nlin; 
  } 
  for(i=eq->nlin; i>insertrow; --i){ 
    eq->A[i]=eq->A[i-1]; 
    if(((eq->b[0][i>>5]>>(i&0x1f))^(eq->b[0][(i-1)>>5]>>((i-
1)&0x1f)))&1) 
      eq->b[0][i>>5]^=(1<<(i&0x1f)); 
  }//ryddet plass til ny linear ligning 
  eq->A[insertrow]=clc; 
  if((u8)((eq->b[0][insertrow>>5]>>(insertrow&0x1f))&1)^rhv)//feil bit 
i RHS 
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    eq->b[0][insertrow>>5]^=(1<<(insertrow&0x1f)); 
  eq->nlin++; 
} 
 
u8 substituteLinComb(struct system *S, u32 *lc, u32 rhv){ 
  /* Largest variable in lc is eliminated using the equation lc = rhv. 
     Returns 0 if system becomes inconsistent, 1 if no A-matrices were 
     reduced, and 2 if some A-matrices did not have full rank after 
     substitution. */  
  int i, j, enord, maxvar, rhsshift, rhsord, sistshift, sisteord; 
  u32 enmask; 
  struct eqSymbol *eq; 
  u8 eqendret, lokrv, rv=1; 
 
  maxvar=largestSetBit(lc,NWORDS); 
  enmask=(1<<(maxvar&0x1f)); 
  enord=maxvar>>5; 
  for(eq=S->E; eq<S->E+S->neq; ++eq){ 
    eqendret=0; 
    for(i=0; i<eq->nlin; ++i){ 
      if(eq->A[i][enord]&enmask){//rekke i i eq har variabelen som skal 
erstattes 
 eqendret=1; 
 for(j=0; j<NWORDS; ++j) 
   eq->A[i][j]^=lc[j]; 
 if(rhv){//maa endre alle rhs 
   rhsshift=1<<(i&0x1f); 
   rhsord=i>>5; 
   for(j=0; j<eq->originalNRHS; ++j){ 
     if(eq->RHSexists[j]) 
       eq->b[j][rhsord]^=rhsshift; 
   } 
 } 
      } 
    } 
    if(eqendret){ 
      lokrv=trimEquation(eq); 
      if(lokrv==0){ 
 printf("trimeq returnerer 0 for ligning %d\n",eq->eqnr); 
 return 0; 
      } 
      if(lokrv==2) 
 rv=2; 
    } 
  } 
  depositLinComb(S->linbank,lc,rhv); 
  //substituted equation added to the bank 
 
  return rv;  
} 
 
void trimSystem(struct system *S){ 
  /* Removes equations with no information in them. */ 
  struct eqSymbol *eq; 
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  for(eq=S->E; eq<S->E+S->neq; ++eq){ 
    if(eq->nlin<32 && (1<<eq->nlin)==eq->nrhs){//ligning uten 
informasjon 
      if(eq<S->E+S->neq-1) 
 *eq=S->E[S->neq-1]; 
      eq--; 
      S->neq--; 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
void initLinBank(struct eqSymbol *leq){ 
  leq->A=(u32 **)malloc(2*NVAR*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  leq->b=(u32 **)malloc(sizeof(u32 *)); 
  leq->b[0]=(u32 *)calloc(2*NWORDS,sizeof(u32)); 
  leq->nlin=0; 
  leq->nrhs=1; 
  leq->nw=0; 
  leq->nn=0; 
  leq->eqnr=-1; 
  leq->originalNRHS=1; 
  leq->RHSexists=(u8 *)malloc(sizeof(u8)); 
  leq->RHSexists[0]=1; 
} 
 
u8 solved(struct system *S){ 
  int i; 
 
  if(S->neq==0) 
    return 1; 
  if(S->neq==1 && S->E[0].nrhs>=1) 
    return 1; 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
    if(S->E[i].nrhs!=1) 
      return 0; 
  } 
  return 1; 
} 
 
void solveLinSystem(struct eqSymbol *e){ 
  int i, j, k, sb, minb, maxb, r; 
  u32 *tmp; 
  u8 ibit, rbit; 
 
  for(i=0; i<e->nlin; ++i){ 
    minb=NVAR; 
    for(j=i; j<e->nlin; ++j){ 
      sb=smallestSetBit(e->A[j],NWORDS); 
      if(sb>=0 && sb<minb){ 
 minb=sb; 
 r=j; 
      } 
      if(minb==i) 
 j=e->nlin; 
    }  
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    if(e->b[0][i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f))) 
      ibit=1; 
    else 
      ibit=0; 
    if(r!=i){//trenger å bytte om på rader 
      tmp=e->A[i]; 
      e->A[i]=e->A[r]; 
      e->A[r]=tmp; 
      if(e->b[0][r>>5]&(1<<(r&0x1f))) 
 rbit=1; 
      else 
 rbit=0; 




      } 
    } 
    for(j=i+1; j<e->nlin; ++j){//lager 0 under ledende 1'er 
      if(e->A[j][minb>>5]&(1<<(minb&0x1f))){ 
 for(k=minb>>5; k<NWORDS; ++k) 
   e->A[j][k]^=e->A[i][k]; 
 if(ibit) 
   e->b[0][j>>5]^=(1<<(j&(0x1f))); 
      } 
    } 
  }//triangularisert, starter tilbakesubstitusjon 
 
  for(i=e->nlin-1; i>0; --i){ 
    maxb=largestSetBit(e->A[i],NWORDS); 
    if(e->b[0][i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f))) 
      ibit=1; 
    else 
      ibit=0; 
    for(j=i-1; j>=0; --j){ 
      if(e->A[j][maxb>>5]&(1<<(maxb&0x1f))){ 
 for(k=0; k<NWORDS; ++k) 
   e->A[j][k]^=e->A[i][k]; 
 if(ibit) 
   e->b[0][j>>5]^=(1<<(j&0x1f)); 
      } 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
void copySystem(struct system *S, struct system *kopiS){ 
  int i, j, k; 
 
  kopiS->neq=S->neq; 
  kopiS->E=(struct eqSymbol *)malloc(kopiS->neq*sizeof(struct 
eqSymbol)); 
  kopiS->linbank=(struct eqSymbol *)malloc(sizeof(struct eqSymbol)); 
  initLinBank(kopiS->linbank); 
  for(i=0; i<S->linbank->nlin; ++i){ 
    for(j=0; j<NWORDS; ++j) 
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      kopiS->linbank->A[i][j]=S->linbank->A[i][j]; 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<S->linbank->nw; ++i) 
    kopiS->linbank->b[0][i]=S->linbank->b[0][i]; 
  kopiS->linbank->nlin=S->linbank->nlin; 
  kopiS->linbank->nw=S->linbank->nw; 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
    kopiS->E[i].nlin=S->E[i].nlin; 
    kopiS->E[i].nrhs=S->E[i].nrhs; 
    kopiS->E[i].originalNRHS=S->E[i].originalNRHS; 
    kopiS->E[i].nw=S->E[i].nw; 
    kopiS->E[i].nn=0; 
    kopiS->E[i].A=(u32 **)malloc(kopiS->E[i].nlin*sizeof(u32 *)); 
    for(j=0; j<kopiS->E[i].nlin; ++j){ 
      kopiS->E[i].A[j]=(u32 *)malloc(NWORDS*sizeof(u32)); 
      for(k=0; k<NWORDS; ++k) 
 kopiS->E[i].A[j][k]=S->E[i].A[j][k]; 
    } 
    kopiS->E[i].b=(u32 **)malloc(kopiS->E[i].nrhs*sizeof(u32 *)); 
    for(j=0; j<kopiS->E[i].nrhs; ++j){ 
      kopiS->E[i].b[j]=(u32 *)malloc(kopiS->E[i].nw*sizeof(u32)); 
      for(k=0; k<kopiS->E[i].nw; ++k) 
 kopiS->E[i].b[j][k]=S->E[i].b[j][k]; 
    } 
    kopiS->E[i].RHSexists=(u8 *)malloc(kopiS-
>E[i].originalNRHS*sizeof(u8)); 
    for(j=0; j<kopiS->E[i].originalNRHS; ++j) 
      kopiS->E[i].RHSexists[j]=S->E[i].RHSexists[j]; 
    kopiS->E[i].delSinceExtract=S->E[i].delSinceExtract; 
  } 
} 
 
double log2sum(double *T, int n){ 
  /* computes log2(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1}(2^{T[i]})).  Works also when the 
sum is greater than 2^{32}. */ 
  double suma, sumb; 
  int na; 
 
  if(n==1) 
    return T[0]; 
  na=n/2; 
  suma=log2sum(T,na); 
  sumb=log2sum(T+na,n-na); 
  if(suma<sumb){ 
    if((sumb-28.0)>suma)//only sumb contributes 
      return sumb; 
    else//compute exactly 
      return suma+log2(pow(2,sumb-suma)+1.0); 
  } 
  else{//suma largest 
    if((suma-28.0)>sumb)//only suma contributes 
      return suma; 
    else//compute exactly 
      return sumb+log2(pow(2,suma-sumb)+1.0); 




u8 evaluate(u32 *lc, u8 *v){ 
  /* evaluates the linear combination lc with the variables in v and 
returns its sum */ 
  int i; 
  u8 sum=0; 
 
  for(i=0; i<NVAR; ++i){ 
    if(lc[i>>5]&(1<<(i&0x1f)) && v[i]) 
      sum^=1; 
  } 
 
  return sum; 
} 
 
2. AGREEING.h (by Havard Raddum and Igor Semaev) 
 
 
u8 checkLink(struct linkSymbol *lS){ 
  /*Checks if the two equations linked in this link agree.  Returns 0 
if equations are inconsistent, 
    1 if equations agree and 2 if equations disagreed */ 
  u8 rv=1, lokrv; 
  int i, j, eqdel, linkIndex, eq0ni, eq1ni; 
  struct eqSymbol *eq, *eq0, *eq1; 
 
  if((log2(lS->ncells)<(log2(lS->nlist[0]->nrhs)/2)) &&  
     (log2(lS->ncells)<(log2(lS->nlist[1]->nrhs)/2))){//do not expect 
deletions 
    for(i=0; i<lS->ncells; ++i){ 
      if(lS->cellExists[i]){ 
 eqdel=2; 
 if(lS->nCover[0][i]==0 && lS->nCover[1][i]>0) 
   eqdel=1; 
 if(lS->nCover[0][i]>0 && lS->nCover[1][i]==0) 
   eqdel=0; 
 if(eqdel<2){ 
   rv=2; 
   eq=lS->nlist[eqdel]; 
   for(j=0; j<eq->nn; ++j){ 
     if(eq->link[j]==lS){ 
       linkIndex=j; 
       j=eq->nn+1; 
     } 
   } 
   if(j==eq->nn){ 
     printf("Fant ikke link!?  eqdel=%d, i=%d\n",eqdel,i); 
     printf("Linkadresse: %x, eq.naboadresse: %x\n",lS,eq-
>link[0]); 
   } 
 
   j=0; 
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   while(lS->nCover[eqdel][i]>0){ 
     while(j<eq->originalNRHS && eq-
>coverID[linkIndex][j]!=(unsigned)i) // !! added cast 
       ++j; 
     if(j==eq->originalNRHS)printf("fant ikke RHS som dekker celle 
%x, lS->nCover=%d\n",i,lS->nCover[eqdel][i]); 
     lokrv=deleteRHS(eq,j); 
     if(lokrv==0) 
       return 0; 
     ++j; 
   } 
   lS->cellExists[i]=0; 
 } 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  else{//expects deletions, goes through RHS's of linked equations 
    eq0=lS->nlist[0]; 
    eq1=lS->nlist[1]; 
    for(i=0; i<eq0->nn; ++i){ 
      if(eq0->link[i]==lS){ 
 eq0ni=i; 
 i=eq0->nn+1; 
      } 
    } 
    if(i==eq0->nn)printf("(checkLink)Fant ikke link fra nabo 0\n"); 
    for(i=0; i<eq1->nn; ++i){ 
      if(eq1->link[i]==lS){ 
 eq1ni=i; 
 i=eq1->nn+1; 
      } 
    } 
    if(i==eq1->nn)printf("(checkLink)Fant ikke link fra nabo 1\n"); 
    for(i=0; i<eq1->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
      if(eq1->RHSexists[i]){ 
 if(lS->nCover[1][eq1->coverID[eq1ni][i]]==0) 
   printf("RHS %d i eq1 dekker en celle som link sier ikke blir 
dekket av eq1\n",i); 
 if(lS->nCover[0][eq1->coverID[eq1ni][i]]==0){ 
   lokrv=deleteRHS(eq1,i); 
   if(lokrv==0) 
     return 0; 
   rv=2; 
 } 
      } 
    } 
    for(i=0; i<eq0->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
      if(eq0->RHSexists[i]){ 
 if(lS->nCover[0][eq0->coverID[eq0ni][i]]==0) 
   printf("RHS %d i eq0 dekker en celle som link sier ikke blir 
dekket av eq0\n",i); 
 if(lS->nCover[1][eq0->coverID[eq0ni][i]]==0){ 
   lokrv=deleteRHS(eq0,i); 
   if(lokrv==0) 
     return 0; 
 68
   rv=2; 
 } 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  return rv; 
} 
 
u8 agreeSystem(struct system *S){ 
  /* Agrees the whole system.  Returns 0 if system is inconsistent, 
     1 if system already agreed, or 2 if deletions of RHS's have 
occurred */ 
  int i; 
  u8 rv=1, lokrv, changed=1; 
  struct linkSymbol *lsym; 
 
  while(changed){ 
    changed=0; 
    for(lsym=S->L; lsym<S->L+S->nlink; ++lsym){ 
      lokrv=checkLink(lsym); 
      if(lokrv==2) 
 changed=1; 
      if(lokrv==0){ 
 printf("inconsistency in link %d\n",i); 
 return 0; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  




3. GLUING.h (by Havard Raddum and Igor Semaev) 
/* Methods inmplementing gluing of equations, before linking */ 
 
u8 maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(u32 *rhs1, u32 *rhs2, int nw, u32 *maske){ 
  int t; 
 
  t=nw-1; 
  while(t>=0 && ((rhs1[t]&maske[t])==(rhs2[t]&maske[t]))) 
    t--; 
  if(t<0) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
u8 maskedRHS1BiggerThanRHS2(u32 *rhs1, u32 *rhs2, int nw, u32 *maske){ 
  int t; 
   
  t=nw-1; 
  while(t>=0 && (rhs1[t]&maske[t])==(rhs2[t]&maske[t])) 
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    t--; 
  if(t>=0 && (rhs1[t]&maske[t])>(rhs2[t]&maske[t])) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
void mergeSortMaskedRightHandSides(u32 **RHS, int nicl, int nw, u32 
*maske){ 
  int niacl, nibcl, i, j, t; 
  u32 *tmp, **aRHS, **bRHS, **dl; 
 
  if(nicl==2 && maskedRHS1BiggerThanRHS2(RHS[0],RHS[1],nw,maske)){ 
    tmp=RHS[0]; 
    RHS[0]=RHS[1]; 
    RHS[1]=tmp; 
  } 
  if(nicl>2){ 
    niacl=nicl/2; 
    nibcl=nicl-niacl; 
    aRHS=RHS; 
    bRHS=RHS+niacl; 
    mergeSortMaskedRightHandSides(aRHS,niacl,nw,maske); 
    mergeSortMaskedRightHandSides(bRHS,nibcl,nw,maske); 
    dl=(u32 **)malloc(nicl*sizeof(u32 *)); 
    i=j=t=0; 
    while(i<niacl && j<nibcl){//ingen er ferdige, må sammenligne 
      if(maskedRHS1BiggerThanRHS2(aRHS[i],bRHS[j],nw,maske)) 
 dl[t++]=bRHS[j++]; 
      else 
 dl[t++]=aRHS[i++]; 
    } 
    if(i==niacl){//aRHS ble ferdig først, kopierer resten av bRHS 
      for(i=j; i<nibcl; ++i) 
 dl[t++]=bRHS[i]; 
    } 
    else{//bRHS ble ferdig først, kopierer resten av aRHS 
      for(j=i; j<niacl; ++j) 
 dl[t++]=aRHS[j]; 
    } 
    //kopierer tilbake i RHS 
    for(i=0; i<nicl; ++i) 
      RHS[i]=dl[i]; 
    free(dl); 
  } 
} 
 
void computeMaskedSortedRHS(struct eqSymbol *eq1, struct eqSymbol *eq2,  
       u32 **Ub1, u32 **Ub2, u32 *maske, u32 **U, int 
ncommon){ 
  /* Expands RHS's in eq1 and eq2 so they can be glued together.  maske 
     shows which bits that must be equal when gluing.  */ 
  u32 *lokb; 
  int i, j, t, sumnl, sumnlw, skev; 
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  sumnl=eq1->nlin+eq2->nlin; 
  sumnlw=(sumnl+31)>>5; 
  lokb=(u32 *)malloc(sumnlw*sizeof(u32)); 
  t=0; 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->originalNRHS; ++i){//computes Ub for all right-hand 
sides b in E1 
    if(eq1->RHSexists[i]){ 
      for(j=0; j<eq1->nw; ++j) 
 lokb[j]=eq1->b[i][j]; 
      for(j=eq1->nw; j<sumnlw; ++j) 
 lokb[j]=0; 
 
      Uxb(U,sumnl,sumnl,lokb,Ub1[t++]); 
    } 
  } 
  if(t!=eq1->nrhs)printf("eq1->nrhs=%d, t=%d\n",eq1->nrhs,t); 
  t=0; 
  for(i=0; i<eq2->originalNRHS; ++i){//computes Ub for all right-hand 
sides b in E2 
    if(eq2->RHSexists[i]){ 
      for(j=0; j<eq1->nw; ++j) 
 lokb[j]=0; 
      skev=(eq1->nlin)&0x1f; 
      if(skev==0){ 
 for(j=eq1->nw; j<sumnlw; ++j) 
   lokb[j]=eq2->b[i][j-eq1->nw]; 
      } 
      else{ 
 for(j=0; j<eq2->nw; ++j){ 
   lokb[eq1->nw+j-1]|=(eq2->b[i][j]<<skev); 
   if(sumnlw>(j+eq1->nw)) 
     lokb[eq1->nw+j]=eq2->b[i][j]>>(32-skev); 
 } 
      } 
      Uxb(U,sumnl,sumnl,lokb,Ub2[t++]); 
    } 
  } 
  if(t!=eq2->nrhs)printf("eq2->nrhs=%d, t=%d\n",eq2->nrhs,t); 
 
  free(lokb);   
 
  i=sumnl-ncommon; 
  j=0; 
  while(i>=32){ 
    maske[j++]=0; 
    i-=32; 
  } 
  if(j<sumnlw){ 
    maske[j]=(0xffffffff<<i); 
    for(i=j+1; i<sumnlw; ++i) 
      maske[i]=0xffffffff; 
    if(sumnl&0x1f) 
      maske[sumnlw-1]&=(1<<(sumnl&0x1f))-1; 
  } 
  //mask in place 
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  mergeSortMaskedRightHandSides(Ub1,eq1->nrhs,sumnlw,maske); 
  mergeSortMaskedRightHandSides(Ub2,eq2->nrhs,sumnlw,maske); 
} 
 
int nRHSwhenGlued(struct eqSymbol *eq1, struct eqSymbol *eq2){ 
  /* Computes number of RHS if gluing eq1 and eq2 */ 
  u32 **Ub1, **Ub2, *maske, **U; 
  int i, j, nn=0, bp1, pp1, bp2, pp2, prod, nw, nl, nc; 
 
  nl=eq1->nlin+eq2->nlin; 
  nw=(nl+31)>>5; 
  U=(u32 **)malloc(nl*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  nc=computeU(eq1,eq2,U); 
  if(nc==0){ 
    for(i=0; i<nl; ++i) 
      free(U[i]); 
    free(U); 
    if((MAXINT/eq1->nrhs)<eq2->nrhs) 
      return MAXINT; 
    else 
      return eq1->nrhs*eq2->nrhs; 
  } 
  Ub1=(u32 **)malloc(eq1->nrhs*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->nrhs; ++i) 
    Ub1[i]=(u32 *)calloc(nw,sizeof(u32)); 
  Ub2=(u32 **)malloc(eq2->nrhs*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq2->nrhs; ++i) 
    Ub2[i]=(u32 *)calloc(nw,sizeof(u32)); 
  maske=(u32 *)malloc(nw*sizeof(u32));  
 
  computeMaskedSortedRHS(eq1,eq2,Ub1,Ub2,maske,U,nc); 
 
  for(i=0; i<nl; ++i) 
    free(U[i]); 
  free(U); 
  bp1=pp1=bp2=pp2=0; 
  while(bp1<eq1->nrhs && bp2<eq2->nrhs && nn<MAXINT){   
    while(bp1<eq1->nrhs && bp2<eq2->nrhs && 
!maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(Ub1[bp1],Ub2[bp2],nw,maske)){ 
      if(maskedRHS1BiggerThanRHS2(Ub1[bp1],Ub2[bp2],nw,maske)) 
 bp2++; 
      else 
 bp1++; 
    }//her er maskert Ub1[bp1] og Ub2[bp2] like, eller en av listene er 
nådd til endes 
    pp1=bp1; 
    pp2=bp2; 
    while(pp1<eq1->nrhs && 
maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(Ub1[bp1],Ub1[pp1],nw,maske)) 
      pp1++; 
    while(pp2<eq2->nrhs && 
maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(Ub2[bp2],Ub2[pp2],nw,maske)) 
      pp2++; 
    //Blokkene fra bp1 og bp2 til pp1 og pp2 er identiske maskert 
    if((pp1-bp1)>0 && MAXINT/(pp1-bp1)<(pp2-bp2)) 
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      nn=MAXINT; 
    prod=(pp1-bp1)*(pp2-bp2); 
    if(nn>MAXINT-prod) 
      nn=MAXINT; 
    if(nn<MAXINT) 
      nn+=prod; 
    bp1=pp1; 
    bp2=pp2; 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->nrhs; ++i) 
    free(Ub1[i]); 
  free(Ub1); 
  for(i=0; i<eq2->nrhs; ++i) 
    free(Ub2[i]); 
  free(Ub2); 
  free(maske); 
 
  return nn; 
} 
 
int estimateNRHSwhenGlued(struct eqSymbol *eq1, struct eqSymbol *eq2){ 
  int i, enn, nc, sumnl; 
  u32 **M; 
 
  sumnl=eq1->nlin+eq2->nlin; 
  M=(u32 **)malloc(sumnl*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->nlin; ++i) 
    M[i]=eq1->A[i]; 
  for(i=eq1->nlin; i<sumnl; ++i) 
    M[i]=eq2->A[i-eq1->nlin]; 
  nc=sumnl-rank(M,sumnl,NVAR); 
  free(M); 
  if((log2(eq1->nrhs)+log2(eq2->nrhs)-(double)nc)<30.9){ 
    if((log2(eq1->nrhs)+log2(eq2->nrhs)-(double)nc)>0.0){ 
      if(eq2->nrhs>eq1->nrhs) 
 enn=(eq1->nrhs>>(nc/2))*(eq2->nrhs>>(nc-(nc/2))); 
      else 
 enn=(eq2->nrhs>>(nc/2))*(eq1->nrhs>>(nc-(nc/2))); 
      if(enn==0) 
 enn=1; 
    } 
    else 
      enn=1; 
  } 
  else 
    enn=MAXINT; 
 
  return enn; 
} 
 
void glue(struct eqSymbol *eq1, struct eqSymbol *eq2, struct eqSymbol 
*geq){ 
  /* Glues together eq1 and eq2 into geq, eq1 and eq2 should not be 
used afterwards. */   
  int i, j, k, bp1, pp1, bp2, pp2, ncommon, t, estnnew; 
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  u32 *maske, **Ub1, **Ub2, **U, **nyA; 
 
  Ub1=(u32 **)malloc(eq1->nrhs*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  Ub2=(u32 **)malloc(eq2->nrhs*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  geq->nlin=eq1->nlin+eq2->nlin; 
  geq->nw=(geq->nlin+31)>>5; 
  geq->A=(u32 **)malloc(geq->nlin*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->nlin; ++i) 
    geq->A[i]=eq1->A[i]; 
  for(i=0; i<eq2->nlin; ++i) 
    geq->A[eq1->nlin+i]=eq2->A[i]; 
 
  nyA=(u32 **)malloc(geq->nlin*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  U=(u32 **)malloc(geq->nlin*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  for(i=0; i<geq->nlin; ++i) 
    nyA[i]=(u32 *)calloc(NWORDS,sizeof(u32)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->nrhs; ++i) 
    Ub1[i]=(u32 *)calloc(geq->nw,sizeof(u32)); 
  for(i=0; i<eq2->nrhs; ++i) 
    Ub2[i]=(u32 *)calloc(geq->nw,sizeof(u32)); 
  maske=(u32 *)malloc(geq->nw*sizeof(u32)); 
 
  ncommon=computeU(eq1,eq2,U); 
  UAX(U,geq->A,nyA,geq->nlin,NWORDS); 
  free(geq->A); 
  geq->A=nyA; 
  computeMaskedSortedRHS(eq1,eq2,Ub1,Ub2,maske,U,ncommon); 
  estnnew=(eq1->nrhs>>(ncommon/2))*(eq2->nrhs>>(ncommon-ncommon/2)); 
  if(estnnew<1) 
    estnnew=1; 
  //printf("estnnew=2^(%.3f), ",log2(estnnew)); 
 
  geq->b=(u32 **)malloc(estnnew*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  bp1=pp1=bp2=pp2=t=0; 
  while(bp1<eq1->nrhs && bp2<eq2->nrhs){   
    while(bp1<eq1->nrhs && bp2<eq2->nrhs && 
!maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(Ub1[bp1],Ub2[bp2],geq->nw,maske)){ 
      if(maskedRHS1BiggerThanRHS2(Ub1[bp1],Ub2[bp2],geq->nw,maske)) 
 bp2++; 
      else 
 bp1++; 
    }//her er maskert Ub1[bp1] og Ub2[bp2] like, eller en av listene er 
nådd til endes 
    pp1=bp1; 
    pp2=bp2; 
    while(pp1<eq1->nrhs && maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(Ub1[bp1],Ub1[pp1],geq-
>nw,maske)) 
      pp1++; 
    while(pp2<eq2->nrhs && maskedRHS1EqualRHS2(Ub2[bp2],Ub2[pp2],geq-
>nw,maske)) 
      pp2++; 
    //Blokkene fra bp1 og bp2 til pp1 og pp2 er identiske maskert, 
limer alle par 
    for(i=bp1; i<pp1; ++i){ 
      for(j=bp2; j<pp2; ++j){ 
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 geq->b[t]=(u32 *)malloc(geq->nw*sizeof(u32)); 
 for(k=0; k<geq->nw; ++k) 
   geq->b[t][k]=Ub1[i][k]^Ub2[j][k];//faktisk liming 
 t++; 
 if(t==estnnew){//needs more memory and a better estimate 
   if(i==0) 
     estnnew*=2; 
   else{ 
     if(i==eq1->nrhs) 
       estnnew+=(pp2-j); 
     else 
       estnnew=(int)((double)estnnew/((double)i/(double)eq1-
>nrhs)); 
   } 
   geq->b=(u32 **)realloc(geq->b,estnnew*sizeof(u32 *)); 
 } 
      } 
    } 
    bp1=pp1; 
    bp2=pp2; 
  } 
  geq->originalNRHS=t; 
  geq->nrhs=t; 
  geq->b=(u32 **)realloc(geq->b,geq->originalNRHS*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  geq->RHSexists=(u8 *)malloc(geq->originalNRHS*sizeof(u8)); 
  for(i=0; i<geq->originalNRHS; ++i) 
    geq->RHSexists[i]=1; 
  if(ncommon>0){//trimmer bort lineært avhengig informasjon 
    for(i=geq->nlin-ncommon; i<geq->nlin; ++i) 
      free(geq->A[i]); 
    geq->nlin-=ncommon; 
    geq->A=(u32 **)realloc(geq->A,geq->nlin*sizeof(u32 *)); 
    geq->nw=(geq->nlin+31)>>5; 
    if(((geq->nlin+31)>>5)<geq->nw){ 
      geq->nw=(geq->nlin+31)>>5; 
      for(i=0; i<geq->nrhs; ++i) 
 geq->b[i]=(u32 *)realloc(geq->b[i],geq->nw*sizeof(u32)); 
    } 
  } 
  geq->nn=0; 
 
  free(maske); 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->nrhs; ++i) 
    free(Ub1[i]); 
  free(Ub1); 
  for(i=0; i<eq2->nrhs; ++i) 
    free(Ub2[i]); 
  free(Ub2); 
} 
 
u8 packSystem(struct system *S, int th){ 
  /* Tries to glue together as many equations as possible, with the 
restriction that the number of  
     right-hand sides in the glued equation should not be estimated to 
be larger than th.   
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     Returns 0 if inconsistencies are found, 1 otherwise. */ 
  struct eqSymbol *nyE, *tmp; 
  int i, j, nnew, minnew, mini, minj, nyneq=0, **gluetab; 
  u8 *limt, tryglue, trypack; 
 
  nyE=(struct eqSymbol *)malloc(S->neq*sizeof(struct eqSymbol)); 
  tmp=(struct eqSymbol *)malloc(sizeof(struct eqSymbol)); 
  limt=(u8 *)calloc(S->neq,sizeof(u8)); 
 
  gluetab=(int **)malloc(S->neq*sizeof(int *)); 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i) 
    gluetab[i]=(int *)calloc(S->neq,sizeof(int)); 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
    for(j=i+1; j<S->neq; ++j){ 
      gluetab[i][j]=estimateNRHSwhenGlued(S->E+i,S->E+j); 
      if(gluetab[i][j]==0){ 
 j=S->neq; 
 i=S->neq+1; 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  if(i==S->neq) 
    tryglue=1; 
  else{//funnet inkonsistens 
    tryglue=2; 
    printf("inconsistency found\n"); 
  } 
  while(tryglue==1){ 
    minnew=th+1; 
    for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
      if(!limt[i]){ 
 for(j=i+1; j<S->neq; ++j){ 
   if(!limt[j]){ 
     nnew=gluetab[i][j]; 
     if(nnew<minnew){ 
       minnew=nnew; 
       mini=i; 
       minj=j; 
     } 
   } 
 } 
      } 
    }//her er billigste liming funnet, hvis mulig aa lime under th 
    if(minnew<=th){//mulig aa lime 
      glue(S->E+mini,S->E+minj,nyE+nyneq); 
      nyE[nyneq].eqnr=nyneq; 
      limt[mini]=1; 
      limt[minj]=1; 
      trypack=1; 
      while(trypack){ 
 minnew=th+1; 
 for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
   if(!limt[i]){ 
     nnew=estimateNRHSwhenGlued(S->E+i,nyE+nyneq); 
     if(nnew==0){ 
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       tryglue=2;  
       printf("Inconsistency Found\n"); 
       i=S->neq; 
     } 
     else{ 
       if(nnew<minnew){ 
  minnew=nnew; 
  mini=i; 
       } 
     } 
   } 
 } 
 if(tryglue==1 && minnew<=th){//mulig aa putte paa en til 
   //printf(" og %d\n",mini); 
   glue(nyE+nyneq,S->E+mini,tmp); 
   limt[mini]=1; 
   deleteEquation(nyE+nyneq); 
   nyE[nyneq]=*tmp; 
 } 
 else 
   trypack=0; 
      } 
      nyneq++; 
    } 
    else 
      tryglue=0; 
  }//har pakket saa godt som mulig, kopierer ulimte symboler 
  if(tryglue<2){ 
    for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
      if(limt[i]) 
 deleteEquation(S->E+i); 




      } 
    } 
    free(S->E); 
    S->E=nyE; 
    S->neq=nyneq; 
    for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i) 
      S->E[i].eqnr=i; 
  } 
  free(limt); 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i) 
    free(gluetab[i]); 
  free(gluetab); 
  if(tryglue==2) 
    return 0; 







/* Methods for linking equations in system */ 
 
void zeroPrepend(u32 *b, int lb, int nzeros, u32 *x){ 
  int xw, n0w, lbw, skev, i; 
 
  n0w=(nzeros>>5); 
  xw=(lb+nzeros+31)>>5; 
  lbw=(lb+31)>>5; 
  for(i=0; i<xw; ++i) 
    x[i]=0; 
  skev=(nzeros&0x1f); 
  if(skev){ 
    for(i=0; i<lbw; ++i){ 
      x[i+n0w]|=(b[i]<<skev); 
      if((i+n0w)<(xw-1)) 
 x[i+n0w+1]|=(b[i]>>(32-skev)); 
    } 
  } 
  else{ 
    for(i=0; i<lbw; ++i) 
      x[i+n0w]=b[i]; 
  } 
} 
 
void zeroAppend(u32 *b, int lb, int nzeros, u32 *x){ 
  int i, xw, lbw; 
 
  lbw=(lb+31)>>5; 
  xw=(lb+nzeros+31)>>5; 
  for(i=0; i<lbw; ++i) 
    x[i]=b[i]; 
  for(i=lbw; i<xw; ++i) 
    x[i]=0; 
} 
 
int collapseCellIDlist(struct bitVector *vl, int nil){ 
  int bp=0, pp=1; 
 
  while(pp<nil){ 
    while(pp<nil && v0EqualV1(vl[bp],vl[pp])) 
      free(vl[pp++].v); 
    if(pp<nil) 
      vl[++bp]=vl[pp++]; 
  } 
 
  return bp+1; 
} 
 
int findCellIndex(struct bitVector *vl, int nil, struct bitVector 
target){ 
  int bunn, topp, midt; 
 
  if(v0GreaterThanV1(vl[0],target))//target smaller than smallest in vl 
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    return -1; 
  if(v0GreaterThanV1(target,vl[nil-1]))//target greater than largest in 
vl 
    return -1; 
  if(v0EqualV1(vl[0],target)) 
    return 0; 
  if(v0EqualV1(vl[nil-1],target)) 
    return nil-1; 
   
  //Know target is not inside boundary of vl 
  bunn=0; 
  topp=nil-1; 
  while((topp-1)>bunn){ 
    midt=(bunn+topp)/2; 
    if(v0EqualV1(vl[midt],target)) 
 
      return midt; 
    if(v0GreaterThanV1(vl[midt],target)) 
      topp=midt; 
    else 
      bunn=midt; 
  } 
 
  return -1; 
} 
 
void establishSmallLink(struct eqSymbol *eq0, struct eqSymbol *eq1, 
struct linkSymbol *ls, u32 **M0, int commondim){ 
  /* Spaces spanned by A-matrices in equations overlap in few 
dimensions, constructs a link with 2^r cells */ 
  int i, j, sumnl, sumnlw; 
  u32 *x, *ci; 
 
  sumnl=eq0->nlin+eq1->nlin; 
  sumnlw=(sumnl+31)>>5; 
  ls->nlist[0]=eq0; 
  ls->nlist[1]=eq1; 
  eq0->link[eq0->nn]=ls; 
  eq1->link[eq1->nn]=ls; 
  ls->ncells=(1<<commondim);//commondim should be small enough for this 
  ls->cellExists=(u8 *)malloc(ls->ncells*sizeof(u8)); 
  for(i=0; i<2; ++i) 
    ls->nCover[i]=(int *)calloc(ls->ncells,sizeof(int)); 
  eq0->coverID[eq0->nn]=(u32 *)malloc(eq0->originalNRHS*sizeof(u32)); 
  eq1->coverID[eq1->nn]=(u32 *)malloc(eq1->originalNRHS*sizeof(u32)); 
  x=(u32 *)malloc(sumnlw*sizeof(u32)); 
  ci=(u32 *)malloc(sizeof(u32)); 
  /* Establish connections for eq0 */ 
  for(i=0; i<eq0->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eq0->RHSexists[i]){ 
      zeroAppend(eq0->b[i],eq0->nlin,eq1->nlin,x); 
      Uxb(M0,commondim,sumnl,x,ci); 
      ls->nCover[0][ci[0]]++; 
      eq0->coverID[eq0->nn][i]=ci[0]; 
    } 
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  } 
  /* Establish connections for eq1 */ 
  for(i=0; i<eq1->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eq1->RHSexists[i]){ 
      zeroPrepend(eq1->b[i],eq1->nlin,eq0->nlin,x); 
      Uxb(M0,commondim,sumnl,x,ci); 
      ls->nCover[1][ci[0]]++; 
      eq1->coverID[eq1->nn][i]=ci[0]; 
    } 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i){ 
    if(ls->nCover[0][i]>0 || ls->nCover[1][i]>0) 
      ls->cellExists[i]=1; 
    else 
      ls->cellExists[i]=0; 
  } 
  eq0->nn++; 
  eq1->nn++; 
 
  free(x); 
  free(ci); 
} 
 
void establishBigLink(struct eqSymbol *eqmin, struct eqSymbol *eqmax, 
struct linkSymbol *ls, u32 **M0, int commondim){ 
  /* Constructs a link where the equations overlap in too many 
dimensions.  The (number of) cells in the link is based on 
     the right-hand sides from the smallest equation */ 
  int i, j, t, sumnl, sumnlw, lcw, newNcell, cellindex; 
  u32 *x; 
  struct bitVector ci; 
 
  sumnl=eqmin->nlin+eqmax->nlin; 
  sumnlw=(sumnl+31)>>5; 
  lcw=(commondim+31)>>5; 
  ls->nlist[0]=eqmin; 
  ls->nlist[1]=eqmax; 
  eqmin->link[eqmin->nn]=ls; 
  eqmax->link[eqmax->nn]=ls; 
  ls->ncells=eqmin->nrhs; 
  if(ls->ncells==0){printf("(establishBigLink)Equations %d and %d 
inconsistent\n",eqmin->eqnr,eqmax->eqnr);exit(0);} 
  ls->cellExists=(u8 *)malloc(ls->ncells*sizeof(u8)); 
  ls->cellID=(struct bitVector *)malloc(ls->ncells*sizeof(struct 
bitVector)); 
  for(i=0; i<2; ++i) 
    ls->nCover[i]=(int *)calloc(ls->ncells,sizeof(int)); 
  eqmin->coverID[eqmin->nn]=(u32 *)malloc(eqmin-
>originalNRHS*sizeof(u32)); 
  eqmax->coverID[eqmax->nn]=(u32 *)malloc(eqmax-
>originalNRHS*sizeof(u32)); 
 
  x=(u32 *)malloc(sumnlw*sizeof(u32)); 
  ci.v=(u32 *)malloc(lcw*sizeof(u32)); 
  ci.length=commondim; 
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  ci.wl=lcw; 
  /* Establish connections for eqmin */ 
  t=0; 
  for(i=0; i<eqmin->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eqmin->RHSexists[i]){ 
      zeroAppend(eqmin->b[i],eqmin->nlin,eqmax->nlin,x); 
      Uxb(M0,commondim,sumnl,x,ci.v); 
      ls->cellID[t].wl=lcw; 
      ls->cellID[t].length=commondim; 
      ls->cellID[t].v=(u32 *)malloc(lcw*sizeof(u32)); 
      for(j=0; j<lcw; ++j) 
 ls->cellID[t].v[j]=ci.v[j]; 
      t++; 
    } 
  }//all different cellIDs, with repetition, created 
  if(t!=eqmin->nrhs){printf("(establishBigLink)More existing RHS's (%d) 
in eqmin than eqmin->nrhs=%d says!\n", 
       t,eqmin->nrhs);exit(0);} 
  mergeSortBitVectors(ls->cellID,ls->ncells); 
  newNcell=collapseCellIDlist(ls->cellID,ls->ncells); 
  if(newNcell<ls->ncells){ 
    ls->ncells=newNcell;//the actual number of cells in this link 
    ls->cellID=(struct bitVector *)realloc(ls->cellID,ls-
>ncells*sizeof(struct bitVector)); 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<2; ++i) 
    ls->nCover[i]=(int *)calloc(ls->ncells,sizeof(int)); 
  for(i=0; i<eqmin->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eqmin->RHSexists[i]){ 
      zeroAppend(eqmin->b[i],eqmin->nlin,eqmax->nlin,x); 
      Uxb(M0,commondim,sumnl,x,ci.v); 
      cellindex=findCellIndex(ls->cellID,ls->ncells,ci); 
      if(cellindex==-1){printf("(establishBigLink)fant ikke 
cellID!");exit(0);} 
      eqmin->coverID[eqmin->nn][i]=cellindex; 
      ls->nCover[0][cellindex]++; 
    } 
  }//link to eqmin created 
  /* Establish connections for eqmax */ 
  for(i=0; i<eqmax->originalNRHS; ++i){ 
    if(eqmax->RHSexists[i]){ 
      zeroPrepend(eqmax->b[i],eqmax->nlin,eqmin->nlin,x); 
      Uxb(M0,commondim,sumnl,x,ci.v); 
      cellindex=findCellIndex(ls->cellID,ls->ncells,ci); 
      if(cellindex==-1)//RHS i does not agree with eqmin 
 deleteRHS(eqmax,i); 
      else{ 
 eqmax->coverID[eqmax->nn][i]=cellindex; 
 ls->nCover[1][cellindex]++; 
      } 
    } 
  }//links created, no more use for cellID, deletes it 
  for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i) 
    free(ls->cellID[i].v); 
  free(ls->cellID); 
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  ls->cellExists=(u8 *)malloc(ls->ncells*sizeof(u8)); 
  for(i=0; i<ls->ncells; ++i){ 
    if(ls->nCover[0][i]>0 || ls->nCover[1][i]>0) 
      ls->cellExists[i]=1; 
    else 
      ls->cellExists[i]=0; 
  } 
  eqmin->nn++; 
  eqmax->nn++; 
 
  free(x); 
  free(ci.v); 
} 
 
void tryEstablishLink(struct system *S, int eqnr0, int eqnr1){ 
  struct eqSymbol *eqmin, *eqmax; 
  struct linkSymbol *ls; 
  int i, commondim, sumnl;// !! deleted var: , sumnlw; 
  u32 **U; 
 
  if(S->E[eqnr0].nrhs<S->E[eqnr1].nrhs){ 
    eqmin=S->E+eqnr0; 
    eqmax=S->E+eqnr1; 
  } 
  else{ 
    eqmin=S->E+eqnr1; 
    eqmax=S->E+eqnr0; 
  }//eqmin goes on top when computing U! 
  sumnl=eqmin->nlin+eqmax->nlin; 
  // !! deleted var: sumnlw=(sumnl+31)>>5; 
  U=(u32 **)malloc(sumnl*sizeof(u32 *)); 
  commondim=computeU(eqmin,eqmax,U); 
  if(commondim>0){/* eqmin and eqmax can exchange information, 
establish link */ 
    ls=S->L+S->nlink; 
    ls->linknr=S->nlink; 
    if(commondim<32 && (1<<commondim)<eqmin->nrhs) 
      establishSmallLink(eqmin,eqmax,ls,U+(sumnl-commondim),commondim); 
    else 
      establishBigLink(eqmin,eqmax,ls,U+(sumnl-commondim),commondim); 
    S->nlink++; 
  } 
  for(i=0; i<sumnl; ++i) 
    free(U[i]); 
  free(U); 
} 
 
void linkSystem(struct system *S){ 
  /* Establishes connections for all pairs of equations that can 
exchange information */ 
  int i, j, eq0ni, eq1ni; 
  struct eqSymbol *eq0, *eq1; 
  struct linkSymbol *ls; 
 
  S->nlink=0; 
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  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
    S->E[i].nn=0; 
    S->E[i].coverID=(u32 **)malloc((S->neq-1)*sizeof(u32 *)); 
    S->E[i].link=(struct linkSymbol **)malloc((S->neq-1)*sizeof(struct 
linkSymbol *)); 
  } 
  S->L=(struct linkSymbol *)malloc(((S->neq*(S->neq-
1))/2)*sizeof(struct linkSymbol)); 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq-1; ++i){ 
    for(j=i+1; j<S->neq; ++j) 
      tryEstablishLink(S,i,j); 
  } 
  S->L=(struct linkSymbol *)realloc(S->L,S->nlink*sizeof(struct 
linkSymbol)); 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i){ 
    S->E[i].coverID=(u32 **)realloc(S->E[i].coverID,S-
>E[i].nn*sizeof(u32 *)); 
    S->E[i].link=(struct linkSymbol **)realloc(S->E[i].link,S-
>E[i].nn*sizeof(struct linkSymbol *)); 
  }  
} 
 
void deLinkSystem(struct system *S){ 
  /* Removes all links in S and frees the memory */ 
  int i; 
  struct eqSymbol *eq; 
  struct linkSymbol *li; 
 
  for(eq=S->E; eq<S->E+S->neq; ++eq){ 
    if(eq->nn>0){ 
      for(i=0; i<eq->nn; ++i) 
 free(eq->coverID[i]); 
      free(eq->coverID); 
      free(eq->link); 
      eq->nn=0; 
    } 
  } 
  for(li=S->L; li<S->L+S->nlink; ++li){ 
    free(li->nCover[0]); 
    free(li->nCover[1]); 
    free(li->cellExists); 
  } 
  free(S->L); 
  S->nlink=0; 
} 
 
void makeLinkTab(struct system *S, int **LT){ 
  int i; 
 
  for(i=0; i<S->neq; ++i) 
    LT[i]=(int *)calloc(S->neq,sizeof(int)); 
  for(i=0; i<S->nlink; ++i){ 
    LT[S->L[i].nlist[0]-(S->E)][S->L[i].nlist[1]-(S-
>E)]=(int)ceil(log2(S->L[i].ncells)); 
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    LT[S->L[i].nlist[1]-(S->E)][S->L[i].nlist[0]-(S-
>E)]=(int)ceil(log2(S->L[i].ncells)); 
  } 
} 
 
void printLinkTab(int **LT, int n){ 
  int i, j; 
 
  for(i=0; i<n; ++i){ 
    for(j=0; j<n; ++j){ 
      printf("%2d",LT[i][j]); 
      if((j+1)%5==0) 
 printf("|"); 
    } 
    if((i+1)%5==0){ 
      printf("\n"); 
      for(j=0; j<n; ++j) 
 printf("--"); 
      for(j=0; j<n/5; ++j) 
 printf("-"); 
    } 
    printf("\n"); 
  } 
} 
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APPENDIX B 
(These codes are intended only to be used for experiments with the 
MRHS method, and neither their author nor the author of this thesis takes any 
responsibility for their use). 
A. GENERATION OF AN EQUATION 
/* 
 aes_eqs.c 
 D. Canright 2008 Sep 10 Wed 12:44:56 
Generate MRHS Equations for 
Small-scale Variants of the AES algorithm  
Also does the encryption! 
Notes: always uses * form: last round no MixCols 
 always keysize = block size 
optional command line arguments: 
 variant (string) = "nrce" to specify small-scale variant of AES: 
   n (hex) is # rounds ( 1 - A; default=A=10 ) 
   r (int) is # rows ( 1, 2, 4; default=4 ) 
   c (int) is # cols ( 1, 2, 4; default=4 ) 
   e (int) is # bits in word ( 2, 4, 8; default=8 ) 
   defaults are "A448" for standard AES = SR*(10; 4; 4; 
8) 
 input (hex)  = plaintext block (default is zero block) 
 output (hex) = key block (default is zero block) 
 outfile (string) = filename of output file (default is stdout) 
while all the above are optional, you must have one to have the next... 
 
save all the X state data (output of S-box after ShiftRows) and K key 
data, 
print it out after the equations. 
encryption re-organized the to give the X state: 
 put ShiftRows before S-box, as part of previous round 
 do NOT do "in place"; rather, put result in new place. 
(ARS) (MARS)*(n-1) (A) rather than 
(A) (SRMA)*(n-1) (SRA) [where R is RowShift, S is SubstBytes, ...] 
Does actual KeySchedule and Encrypt. 





#define MAXROUNDS 10 
#define MAXROWS 4 
#define MAXCOLS 4 
#define MAXBITS 8 
#define MAXBLOCK MAXROWS*MAXCOLS 
#define MAXKEY MAXBLOCK 
#define MAXVARS MAXROUNDS*MAXROWS*(MAXCOLS+1) 
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#define SR(c,r) ( (c+r) & (nCols-1) ) 
 
unsigned char RoundKeys[(MAXROUNDS + 1) * MAXBLOCK]; 
unsigned char States[(MAXROUNDS + 2) * MAXBLOCK]; 
unsigned int *Log; 
unsigned char *ALog, *Sbox, *Mix, *InvMix, fieldmask; 
int nRounds = 10, nRows = 4, nCols = 4, nBits = 8, star = 1, field, 
block, 
    KeyBits, KeyCols, nKeyCols; 
int nEqs, nVars, nKeyVars; 
unsigned char PT[MAXBLOCK], CT[MAXBLOCK], Eq[2][MAXVARS], Data[2]; 
enum InOut { In, Out }; 
enum VarType { Key, X, State }; 
 







































































unsigned int Log4[16] = { 
0,  0,  1,  4,  2,  8,  5, 10,  3, 14,  9,  7,  6, 13, 11, 12, 
}; 
 
unsigned char ALog4[16] = { 
1,  2,  4,  8,  3,  6, 12, 11,  5, 10,  7, 14, 15, 13,  9,  1,  
}; 
 
unsigned int Log2[4] = { 
0,  0,  1,  2, 
}; 
 
unsigned char ALog2[4] = { 
1,  2,  3,  1,  
}; 
 








































unsigned char Sbox2[4] = { 
 2, 3, 1, 0, 
}; 
 




















// multiply by "2" in field 
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#define POLY8 0x1B 
#define POLY4 0x13 
#define POLY2 0x07 
unsigned char HIBIT, POLY; 
unsigned char mul2 (unsigned char x) { 
    unsigned char y; 
    y = x << 1; 
    if ( x & HIBIT ) y ^= POLY; 
    return( y ); 
} 
 
// multiply two bytes in field 
unsigned char mul(unsigned char x, unsigned char y) 
{ 
    if (x && y) 
        return (ALog[(Log[x] + Log[y]) % (field - 1)]); 
    else 
        return (0); 
} 
 
#include "eqs_io.h"    // include I/O package 
 
// set up specific small-scale variant of AES 
// assumes main() already set: nRounds, nRows, nCols, nBits, star  
int setup(void) 
{ 
    int returnval = 0; 
 
// check parameters for validity 
    if (nRounds < 1 || nRounds > MAXROUNDS) { 
 nRounds = 10; 
 returnval = 1; 
    } 
    if (!(nCols == 1 || nCols == 2 || nCols == 4)) { 
 nCols = 4; 
 returnval = 1; 
    } 
 
    switch (nBits) { 
    case 2: 
        Log = Log2; 
        ALog = ALog2; 
 Sbox = Sbox2; 
 POLY = POLY2; 
 field = 4; 
 break; 
    case 4: 
        Log = Log4; 
        ALog = ALog4; 
 Sbox = Sbox4; 
 POLY = POLY4; 
 field = 16; 
 break; 
    default: 
 nBits = 8; 
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 returnval = 1;  // if bad value, use default, fall thru 
    case 8: 
        Log = Log8; 
        ALog = ALog8; 
 Sbox = Sbox8; 
 POLY = POLY8; 
 field = 256; 
 break; 
    } 
 
    switch (nRows) { 
    case 1: 
 Mix = InvMix = Mix1; 
 break; 
    case 2: 
 Mix = InvMix = Mix2; 
 break; 
    default: 
 nRows = 4; 
 returnval = 1;  // if bad value, use default, fall thru 
    case 4: 
 Mix = Mix4; 
 InvMix = (nBits == 2) ? InvMix42 : InvMix4; 
 break; 
    } 
    fieldmask = field - 1; 
    HIBIT = 1 << (nBits - 1); 
    setScale();  // set up bit matrices for scalars 
    block = nRows * nCols; 
    KeyBits = block * nBits; 
    nKeyCols = (nRounds + 1) * nCols; 
    nKeyVars = block + nRounds * nRows; 
    nVars = nKeyVars + block * (nRounds - 1); 
    nEqs = nVars; 
 
    return returnval; 
} 
 
int KeySchedule(unsigned char Key[]) 
{ 
    int colbits, returnval = 0; 
    int r, c; 
    unsigned char col[MAXROWS], t, rcon; 
 
    colbits = nRows * nBits; 
    KeyCols = KeyBits / colbits; 
#define NOISY 0 
#if NOISY 
fprintf(stderr,"-KeySched: colbits=%d, KeyCols=%d, nKeyCols=%d, 
Key=%p\n", 
 colbits, KeyCols, nKeyCols, Key); 
fprintf(stderr,"-Key: "); 





    /* Copy key */ 
    for (c = 0; c < KeyCols; c++) 
        for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) 
            RoundKeys[r + nRows * c] = Key[r + nRows * c]; 
    for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) 
        col[r] = Key[r + nRows * (c - 1)]; 
#if NOISY 
fprintf(stderr,"-KeySched: Key copied; c=%d, col= ", c); 





    for (rcon = 1; c < nKeyCols; c++) { 
        /* calculate new columns until enough */ 
        if (c % KeyCols == 0) { 
            t = col[0]; 
            for (r = 0; r < (nRows - 1); r++) 
                col[r] = Sbox[col[r + 1]]; 
            col[nRows - 1] = Sbox[t]; 
            col[0] ^= rcon; 
#if NOISY 
fprintf(stderr,"-KeySched: apply F; t=%X, rcon=%X, col= ", t, rcon); 




            rcon = mul(2, rcon); 
        } 
// need to handle KeyCols = 1 differently  
        for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) 
            RoundKeys[r + nRows * c] = (KeyCols == 1) ? col[r] : 
                (col[r] ^= RoundKeys[r + nRows * (c - KeyCols)]); 
#if 0 
fprintf(stderr,"-KeySched: RoundKeys col[%d]= ", c); 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) fprintf(stderr, (nBits>4)?"%02X":"%01X",  
 RoundKeys[r + nRows * c]); 
fprintf(stderr,"\n"); fflush(stderr); 
#endif 
    } 
 
    return returnval; 
} 
 
// do one round on block: (ARS) for #0 or else (MARS) 
void doround(unsigned char State[], unsigned char roundKey[], 
             int round) 
{ 
    unsigned char t[MAXROWS]; 
    int i, r, c, offset=0; 
    if (round)             // if normal round 
        for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++) { 
            for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) 
                for (t[r] = i = 0; i < nRows; i++) 
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                    t[r] ^=             // MixColumns 
                        mul(Mix[i], State[((r + i) % nRows) + nRows * 
c]); 
            for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) 
                State[block + r + nRows * c] = t[r]; 
        } 
else offset = -block; 
State += block; 
   for (i = 0; i < block; i++) 
        State[i] = State[offset+i] ^ roundKey[i];        // AddRoundKey 
   for (r = 1; r < nRows; r++) { 
        for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++)     // ShiftRows 
            t[c] = State[r + nRows * ((c + r) % nCols)]; 
        for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++) 
            State[r + nRows * c] = t[c]; 
    } 
   for (i = 0; i < block; i++) 




// do round #n on block: (A) 
void doroundn(unsigned char State[], unsigned char roundKey[]) 
{ 
    int i; 
 
    for (i = 0; i < block; i++) 




// encrypt block (NOT in place - keep output of each S-box) 
void encrypt( void ) 
{ 
    int i, round; 
 
    for (i = 0; i < block; i++)  
     States[i] = PT[i];  // copy PT in 
    for (round = 0; round < nRounds; round++) { 
        doround( States + round*block, RoundKeys + round*block, round); 
    } 
    doroundn(States + round*block, RoundKeys + round*block); 
    for (i = 0; i < block; i++)  
     CT[i] = States[(nRounds+1)*block + i]; // copy CT out 
} 
 
void NewEq( void ) 
{ 
    int i, r; 
 
    for (r = In; r <= Out; r++) { 
    Data[r] = 0; 
    for (i = 0; i < nVars; i++) 
        Eq[r][i] = 0; 




int VarNum( enum VarType var,  
 int round, int col, int row ) 
{ 
    switch (var) { 
    case Key: 
 if (round == 0) 
     return ( col * nRows + row ); 
 else   // then  col == 0 
     return ( block + (round-1) * nRows + row ); 
    case X: 
 return ( nKeyVars + (round-1) * block + col * nRows + row ); 
    } 
    return ( 0 );  // dummy 
} 
 
void AddVar( enum InOut line, enum VarType var,  
 int round, int col, int row, int scale ) 
{ 
    int r; 
 
    switch (var) { 
    case Key: 
 if (round == 0 || col == 0) 
     Eq[line][ VarNum( Key, round, col, row ) ] ^= scale; 
 else { 
     AddVar( line, Key, round, col-1, row, scale ); 
     AddVar( line, Key, round-1, col, row, scale ); 
 } 
 break; 
    case X: 
 Eq[line][ VarNum( X, round, col, row ) ] ^= scale; 
 break; 
    case State:  // scale must be 1 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) { 
     AddVar( line, X, round, col, (row+r)&(nRows-1), Mix[r] ); 
 } 
 AddVar( line, Key, round, col, row, 1 ); 
 break; 





    int i, r; 
    unsigned char rcon; 
 
    for (i = 1, rcon = 1; i <= nRounds; i++) { 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) { 
     NewEq(); 
     AddVar( Out, Key, i, 0, r, 1); 
     if ( nCols > 1 ) AddVar( Out, Key, i-1, 0, r, 1); 
     AddVar( In, Key, i-1, nCols-1, (r+1)&(nRows-1), 1); 
     if ( r == 0 ) Data[ Out ] = rcon; 
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     WriteEq(); 
 } 
 rcon = mul2(rcon); 
    } 
} 
 
// do only 1 round on block 
void doonlyroundEqs(int round) 
{ 
    int r, c; 
 
    for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++) { 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) { 
     NewEq(); 
     AddVar( Out, Key, round, c, r, 1); 
     Data[ Out ] = CT[ r + nRows * c ]; 
     AddVar( In, Key, round-1, SR(c,r), r, 1); 
     Data[ In ] = PT[ r + nRows * SR(c,r) ]; 
     WriteEq(); 
 } 
    } 
} 
 
// do round #1 on block 
void doround1Eqs(int round) 
{ 
    int r, c; 
 
    for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++) { 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) { 
     NewEq(); 
     AddVar( Out, X, round, c, r, 1); 
     AddVar( In, Key, round-1, SR(c,r), r, 1); 
     Data[ In ] = PT[ r + nRows * SR(c,r) ]; 
     WriteEq(); 
 } 
    } 
} 
 
// do one round on block 
void doroundEqs(int round) 
{ 
    int r, c; 
 
    for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++) { 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) { 
     NewEq(); 
     AddVar( Out, X, round, c, r, 1); 
     AddVar( In, State, round-1, SR(c,r), r, 1); 
     WriteEq(); 
 } 
    } 
} 
 
// do round #n on block 
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void doroundnEqs(int round) 
{ 
    int r, c; 
 
    for (c = 0; c < nCols; c++) { 
 for (r = 0; r < nRows; r++) { 
     NewEq(); 
     AddVar( Out, Key, round, c, r, 1); 
     AddVar( In, State, round-1, SR(c,r), r, 1); 
     Data[ Out ] = CT[ r + nRows * c ]; 
     WriteEq(); 
 } 





    int round; 
 
    if ( nRounds == 1 ) { 
        doonlyroundEqs(1); 
        return; 
        } 
    doround1Eqs(1); 
    for (round = 2; round < nRounds; round++) { 
 doroundEqs(round); 
    } 
    doroundnEqs(round); 
} 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
unsigned char Key[MAXBLOCK]; 
 
    if (argc > 1) { 
 sscanf(argv[1], "%1x%1d%1d%1d", 
     &nRounds, &nRows, &nCols, &nBits); 
    } 
    fprintf(stderr, " nRounds=%d, nRows=%d, nCols=%d, nBits=%d, 
star=%d\n", 
     nRounds, nRows, nCols, nBits, star); 
    if (setup()) 
 fprintf(stderr, 
  "Bad parameter(s); now:\n nRounds=%d, nRows=%d, nCols=%d, 
nBits=%d, star=%d\n", 
  nRounds, nRows, nCols, nBits, star); 
//  by default KeyBits = bits in block 
 ReadBlock( (argc > 2) ? argv[2] : "", PT); 
 ReadBlock( (argc > 3) ? argv[3] : "", Key); 
    if (argc > 4) 
 if (freopen(argv[4], "w", stdout) != stdout) { 
     fprintf(stderr, "Could not open output file %s\n", argv[4]); 




    KeySchedule(Key); 
    encrypt(); 
     
    WriteSystemHeader(); 
    KeyScheduleEqs(); 
//  do only single block 
    EncryptEqs(); 
     
    WriteVars(); 
    printf(" nRounds=%d, nRows=%d, nCols=%d, nBits=%d, star=%d\n", 
     nRounds, nRows, nCols, nBits, star); 
    WriteKeys(); 
    WriteStates(); 
 
    return (0); 
} 
 
B. MRHS algorithm 
/* 
        mrhs.c 
        D. Canright 2008 Aug 22 Fri 13:58:27 
Interactive tool to solve MRHS equations 
 
input file format: 
header: 
 NVAR # variables 
 neq # equations (symbols) 
for each equation symbol: 
 nlin # rows 
 nrhs # RHS 
 A (by rows, binary) 




#include "mrhs.h"  // includes all others  
#include <ctype.h> 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    int i, n; 
    char input[101], *filename; 
    char menu[] = {  
"Enter commands from the menu below.\n" 
"  # means a number is required: use nondigit for default value (or for 
'all')\n" 
   "l   linkSystem(S);\n" 
   "a   agreeSystem(S);\n" 
   "d   deLinkSystem(S);\n" 
   "g # packSystem(S, #); (glue)\n" 
   "x   extractLinearInfo(S);\n" 
   "w   writeSystem(S);\n" 
   "i # EquationInfo(&S->E[#]);\n" 
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   "p # printEquation(&S->E[#]);\n" 
   "e   printLinEquation(S->linbank, 0, S->linbank->nlin);\n" 
   "t   writeLinkTab(S, 36);\n" 
   "q   QUIT (exit)\n" 
    }; 
 
//    struct eqSymbol *tmpeq = (struct eqSymbol *) malloc(sizeof(struct 
eqSymbol)); 
    struct system *S = (struct system *) malloc(sizeof(struct system 
)); 
 CHECKPTR(S);  // test of macro 
/*  







 i = 0; 




if ( argc > 1 ) filename = argv[1]; 
else { 
  fprintf( stderr, "Enter filename for input system: "); 
  scanf("%100s", input); 
  filename = input; 
  } 
if ( readSystem(S, filename) ) { 
  fprintf( stderr, "Error in main: did not get input system; abort!\n" 
); 
  return ( 1 ); 
  } 
printf("got: NVAR = %d (NWORDS = %d); neq = %d\n", NVAR, NWORDS, S->neq 
); 
printf(menu); 
while ( scanf("%100s",input) == 1 ) { 


















if ( input[1] ) i=1; 
else { scanf("%100s",input); i = 0; } 
if ( isdigit(input[i]) ) { 
  sscanf( input+i, "%d", &i ); 
  if ( i < 0 || i >= S->neq ) {fprintf(stderr," bad eq #: %d\n",i); 
break;} 
  printEquation(&S->E[i]); 
  } 
else 




if ( input[1] ) i=1; 
else { scanf("%100s",input); i = 0; } 
if ( isdigit(input[i]) ) { 
  sscanf( input+i, "%d", &i ); 
  if ( i < 0 || i >= S->neq ) {fprintf(stderr," bad eq #: %d\n",i); 
break;} 
  EquationInfo(&S->E[i]); 
  } 
else 




if ( input[1] ) i=1; 
else { scanf("%100s",input); i = 0; } 
if ( isdigit(input[i]) ) 
  sscanf( input+i, "%d", &i ); 
else 
  i = 1024;   // arbitrarily picked a (small) max size of glued eqns 





























printf("now: neq = %d ; nlink = %d ; linbank = %d\n", 
 S->neq, S->nlink, S->linbank->nlin ); 
} 
 
    return (0); 
} 
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